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This paper aims at examining Brazilian firms' activities 
abroad. These activities cover a wide range, from simple goods 
exports to direct investment in wholly-controlled subsidiaries, 
and includes service exports, turn key operations, licencing 
agreements, production share and risk service contracts, management 
contracts and joint ventures. 
This wide range comprehends, therefore, activities which 
constitute pure sales, others which correspond to traditional direct 
investment abroad and still those which are both sale operations 
and involves at least an element of investment by Brazilian firms. 
As suggested by Oman (1982), investment implies the acquisition 
of rights to future income so that the investing firms' profit 
is derived from the output of (value created by) the investment 
project. As a result, trânsactions implying some degree of access 
to, and control over the value created by an undertaking in a host 
country involve at least an element of investment by the firm. 
This paper is primarily concerned with those undertakings 
abroad which involve at least an element of investment. This excludes 
simple manufacturing export operations but may include activities 
classified under all other categories. Furthermore, this paper is 
mainly concerned with the actitivites of manufacturing and 
engineering firms. 
It is worth pointing out, however, that, despite its main 
interest in undertakings which involve some element of investment, 
this paper focuses also an those which do not exactly fit such a 
description. Brazilian firms' activities abroad are recent and few. 
In this context, it is relevant not only to examine the current 
characteristics of these activities but also to evaluate the 
possibility of their changing into new forms and to identify the 
prospects for the movement of Brazilian firms towards the external 
market.
Part I presents an inventory of Brazilian fir
ms' activities 
abroad. After a general account of these activit
ies, it focuses on 
direct investment and technology and service exp
orts by manufacturing 
and engineering firms. Part II evaluates the indu
cing factors and 
the prospects for the movement of such firms 
towards the external 
market. 
PART I 
THE ACTIVITIES OF BRAZILIAN FIRMS ABROAD: AN INVENTORY 
The sixties brought a vigorous movement of Brazilian 
companies towards foreign markets. This movement implied a 
substantial increase in exports and also significant changes in its 
composition. The growth of direct overseas investments was also 
significant, as were technology exports by manufacturing and 
engineering companies. 
Although this study will not dwell on goods exports, it 
is worth giving some general indicators (Table 1)as background to an 
understanding of the other overseas activities of Brazilian firms. 
The expansion of exports in the seventies is related to a 
number of fiscal and financial incentives, mainly to the export of 
manufactured goods, established in the late sixties. These export 
incentives aimed not only at increasing foreign exchange revenues, 
but also at the diversification of Brazilian exports, reducing 
dependency on primary products, and at making exports a stimulus 
for industrial growth. 
In this context, Brazilian exports grew at an annual rate 
of 18.1% from 1970-1982, from US$ 2,7 billion to US$ 20.2 billion. 
The expansion of manufacturing exports was even more impressive, 
up from US$ 0.4 billion in 1970 to US$ 10.2 billion in 1982, at an 
average annual rate of 30.6%. This brought a progressive rise in the 
share of manufactured goods in the total exports from 8% in 1965 to 
15% in 1970, leveling off at 30% in the mid-seventies; at the end 
of the decade, this percentage expanded again, to 50% in 1982. 
1. Direct investment abroad 
  
while only partially revealing the magnitude of overseas 
investments by Brazilian companies, available information shows a 
significant increase in their volume since the mid-sixties.
There are two sources of data on th
ese investments. The 
£irst is the Central Bank's certif
icates of authorization for the 
transfer of resources out of the 
country, which are published in 
the Diário Oficial da União. The s
econd source is the balance of 
payments, which gives the amount act
ually transferred as overseas 
investments. 
The two time series derived from each 
of these sources 
(Table 2) reveal major discrepancies, 
with authorized figures 
! 
sistematically (except in 1971) below 
actual transfers. One reason 
for the difference, of course, is the
 very nature of each source: 
authorized investments may or may not
 be carried out, or at least 
not in the same year as the authoriza
tion. This, however, does not 
explain the magnitude of the deviation
s. In fact, most of the 
discrepancies are explained by the o
verseas investments of Banco 
&o Brasil and by the Brazilian gove
rnment's investments in the 
Itaipu Binacional. Both of these are 
included in the balance of 
payments, but neither requires author
ization by the Central Bank. 
Both sources, however, underesti
mate the volume of 
overseas risk capítal owned by per
sons or firms located in Brazil 
as they do not take into account th
e reinvestment of profits earned 
abroad. There is no way to calculate 
the underestimation implicit 
in available data, Information pres
ented and giscussed here should 
thus be viewed with caution, since 
it represents only part of 
Brazilian direct investment abroad. 
The time series of authorized inves
tments shows a tendency 
to growth, despite sharp fluctuation
s between 1975-1978, when 
exceptionally high figures in 1975 an
d 1977 are followed by much 
lower amounts in 1976 and 1978. If b
i-annual figures are used, 
though, grouping 1975-76 and 1977-78, 
both series of nominal and 
real values show continual growth. T
he real values show that 
overseas investments, after a first 
spurt in 1972-73, reach more 
significant values and begin a clearl
y ascending tendency after 
1974. As we will soon see, however, th
is growth initially reflects 
an isolated phenomenon. 
The rapid growth of Brazilian overseas investments is also 
clear in the time series of resources actually transferred abroad, 
as compared with the flow of foreign investments into Brazil. In 
fact, the ratio between the two, systematically below 10% through 
1974, averaged 17% in the 1975-82 period. It is impossible, 
however, 
to identify any defined tendencies during the period, since the 
percentage fluctuates between 11% and 24%. 
Table 3 shows the breakdown of authorized investments for 
1977-83, according to the economic sector of the investing firm. 
For the previous period, the only information is that the oil 
sector accounted for 85% àând 60% of the amounts authorized in 1975 
and 1976, respectively. Thus the significant increase observed in 
the mid-seventies was due to a sudden expansion of Petrobrãs' 
overseas activities, in the wake of the oil crisis. Only 
in 1978 
aid the movement towards the external market cease to be a phenomenon 
restricted to one sector (and one firm). From that year on, most 
investments come from the financial sector, as a result of the 
involvement of the Brazilian banking system in attracting resources 
on international money markets, and its expansion throughout Latin 
America in liaison with the growth of Brazilian exports to the 
region. Other sectors also grew throughout the period, both 
in 
absolute terms and as a percentage of total investments. It is 
worth noting, however, that the exceptionally high figures for the 
manufacturing sector in 1979 and 1981 are the result of investments 
by a single firm (US$ 35 million and US$ 30 million,respectively). 
Without these investments, manufacturing industry's share in the 
period drops to 8.5%. 
In relation to the geographic distribution of Brazilian 
overseas investments, it is noteworthy the changes occurred in the 
late seventies, with a declinein the share going to developed 
countries from 82% in the 1965-76 period to 59% in 1977-82 (Table 4). 
On the other hand, investments in Latin America and in the tax havens 
rose from 10.5% to 22.5% and from 6% to 17%, respectively. This 
change, to a great extent, reflects the £all in Petrobras! share of 
investments and is also somewhat deceptive with regards to the 
ultimate location of investment, In fact, Petrobrãs has normally 
 
chaneled its entire flow of investments through the United Sta
tes 
to the other regions in which it operates. For 
example, available 
information on the years 1972-76 indicates that investme
nts sent to 
the US were subsequently transferred to Iraq (28%), Algeria
 (19%), 
Iran (11%), Colombia (11%), Libya (9%), Madagascar, the 
Philippines 
and Norway. 
Table 5 shows the destination of each sector's investments 
in the 1977-82 period. For financial institutions, nearly 90
% of , 
the investments go to developed countries and to Latin 
America, : 
reflecting the nature of these firms' overseas expansion 
described 
above. The large share of developed economies in the 
case of the 
oil sector is also a result of the above-mentioned Petrob
rãs 
policies. As for manufacturing industry, the figures are 
strongly 
influenced by the investments of a single firm in the Antill
es; 
disregarding this investment, Latin America's share ris
es to 56% 
and that of the developed countries to 37%. More than 80% of 
the 
engineering companies' investments go to Latin America and 
the 
Caribbean tax havens. 
1.1. The manufacturing sector 
One hundred and twenty three manufacturing firms invest
ed 
abroad during the period 1977-82, These investments, were
 higly 
concentrated: 47% of the US$ 138.3 million invested by suc
h firms 
was made by one company; the second and third largest 
investors, 
together, accounted for 19.2% of the total; the 
next 18, with 
investments between US$ 1 to 5 million each, bring the 
total to 89%; 
and, finally, the 63 companies with investments of US$ 10
0 thousand 
or more account for 98.4% of the total amount (Table 6). 
The 
following discussion refers to these 63 companies. 
Most of the 63 companies! overseas investments (52 of them)
 
are restricted to only one country; eight have investments
 in two 
countries, one in three, one in four and one in si
x countries. 
Thirty seven of them operate in Latin American countries (
Table 7), 
with 31 of these in only one Latin American country; 24 
have 
investment in developed economies, one in Africa and six in tax 
havens (of the latter, only one also has investments in other 
regions). 
There is a clear predominance of local firms among the 63 
Brazilian overseas investors. Only five are foreign subsidiaries 
established in Brazil, and these respond for 3.6% of the total 
amount invested by the 63 companies. Among the local firms, there 
is only one that is State-owned (Embraer), with a million dollars 
invested in the United States. 
As for the branch of activity of the investors, the 
largest share of total investment (54%) corresponds to the food 
processing industry. This percentage, though, is basically the result 
of the presence of a single large investor — a sugar producing 
company — responsible for a 65-million-dollar investment (48% of 
the total) in a trading company headquartered in the Caribbean. If 
this company is excluded, there is a clear predominance of the 
metal-mechanic segment: 35 firms in this segment account for 35% 
of total investment (this percentage rises to 67% when we exclude 
the US$ 65 million invested by the firm mentioned above). Once 
again, however, this high share reflects the presence of big 
investors, this time a steel manufacturer with US$ 14.5 million 
invested in Uruguay and a sound-equipment producer with a US$12,0 
million investment in Great Britain. 
Excluding these three major investors (responsible for 
66% of total investments), we are left with the following order of 
the industrial branches: food processing (US$ 8.3 million,six 
companies); electrical equipment (US$ 7.9 million, seven companies) ; 
mechanical machines and equipment (US$ 6.7 million, twelve companies) ; 
textile and apparel (US$ 5.5 million, five companies); non-metalic 
minerals (US$ 4.9 million, four companies); transport equipment 
US$ 3.7 million, seven companies); metallurgy (US$ 2,4 million, 
seven companies) and plastics US$ 2.3 million, two companies). 
Among these branches, the machinery industry stands out 
not only with the largest number of overseas investors but also 
with the greatest geographical diversification of the companies"
investments. One firm has investments in six 
countries (all in 
Latin America), another in four (two Latin Ame
rican and two developed 
countries) and three have investments in two co
untries (at least one 
in Latin America). In addition, of the twelve co
mpanies in this 
branch, only three do not have investments in 
other Latin American 
countries. 
As stated at the beginning, the data obtained f
rom the 
transfer authorization certificates issued by th
e Central Bank , 
offer only a partial picture of Brazilian investme
nt abroad, since 
they refer only to investments made with resource
s transferred from 
Brazil. Additional information — obtained from 
the financial 
statements and reports of the companies and publis
hed in a book 
which examines the composition of 187 local business
 groups (Atlas 
Financeiro) — allows us to identify more precisely
 the overseas 
activities of eleven cf the companies identified 
in the Central 
Bank register. (*) These eleven firms include the th
ree largest 
investors and account for investments registere
d with the Central 
Bank on the order of US$ 100 million, or 72% 
of all investments 
carried out by manufacturing firms. 
tn the case of the three largest investors, this ad
ditional 
data reveals that Central Bank records do not sho
w the full extent 
of their overseas activities. Thus, the sugar p
roducer (Copersucar), 
besides the company in the Caribbean already menti
oned, has indirect 
control — through the Caribbean subsidiary — on 
à North American 
food-processing company (**). The sound equipment 
manufacturer 
(Gradiente) which has taken over the British firm
 Garrard Engineering 
Ltd. (registered by the Central Bank) has acquir
ed also Garrard's 
subsidiaries in the US, Germany and New Zealand. 
In addition, Gradi- 
ente also has a Mexican subsidiary not registere
d by the Central 
Bank. Thus, of the three largest investors, 
the official records 
are accurate only in the case of the steel 
manufacturer, Gerdau. 
(*) The Atlas also lists three cases of manufacturing compani
es — an instant 
coffee producer, a beverage company and a foundry — 
with overseas 
investments that are not included among the 123 companies iden
tified in 
the Central Bank register. 
(**) This North American subsidiary was sold out recently, ho
wever . 
de 
as for the other eight firms
, only in two cases does t
he 
information from the company
 reports indicate greater 
overseas 
involvment than what has alr
eady been suggested. Yet th
e new 
information gives a better 
picture of the nature of in
vestments 
abroad. Four of these eight 
firms participate in joint 
ventures 
abroad. The Vilares group, 
which produces machinery and
 equipment 
and has investments in six L
atin American countries, ful
ly owns its 
subsidiaries in Argentina, c
hile, Uruguay and Paraguay, 
but holgs 
85% of the stock of its Colo
mbian subsidiary and shares 
with a local 
investor control of a firm 
in Mexico (it holds 49% of 
the capital). 
Munck, also in machinery and 
equipment, while controlling 
a 
subsidiary in Argentina, hold
s only 37.5% of the stock of
 a Mexican 
company. Bicicletas Caloi o
wns 49% of the capital of th
e companies 
in which it participates in 
Bolivia and Colombia. Finally
, the 
Ferraz de Andrade group has 3
8% of the capital of Acepar, 
à steel 
works in Paraguay, associated
 with a local State-owned ho
lding 
company (60% of the capital) 
and with Tenenge, à Brazilian
 engineering 
company (2%). 
1.2 - Engineering firms 
Overseas investments by en
gineering firms from 1977-8
2 
involved 33 companies. They 
were higly concentrated, wi
th the three 
largest investors accounting 
for 68% of the total. Further
more, only 
19 invested more than US$ 10
0 thousand during the period
. The 
following comments refer to 
these 19 firms, responsible 
for 99% of 
total investment (Table 8).
 
Most of the 19 firms invested
 in only one country during 
the period; only six invested 
in two different countries. E
ight 
have investments in Latin Ame
rica and seven in tax havens.
 In 
distinction to the manufa
cturing companies, more f
irms in this 
sector invested in Africa (fo
ur of them only in Africa) an
d 
relatively fewer invested in 
developed countries. As for 
the 
ownership of the Brazilian i
nvestors, only two are foreig
n 
subsidiaries, with US$ 1.64 
million investments (us$ 
1.5 million 
in the Caribbean and the rest
 in Mexico). 
 
«10. 
Ten of these 19 investors are construction 
companies, 
accounting for US$ 18.7 million tor 60% of total 
investments), of 
which 57% in Latin America and 38% in tax havens 
(Table 9). Five 
of them are in the building sector, with t
heir investments 
(US$ 11.6 million) concentrated in tax havens (
61%) and developed 
countries (35%). The consulting, design and assem
blying firms 
account for a small share, both in numbers (fou
r) and in the volume 
of their investments (4% of the total). 
It is worth noting that ten of these 19 companie
s will 
reappear in this study as contractors for overse
as projects and/or 
exporters of engineering services. Six of the 14 co
mpanies with less 
than US$100 thousand in investments are also part 
of this group. Of 
the 16 firms identified here as both investors a
nd service contractors, 
seven operate in the construction sector 
(US$16.7 million) and nine 
in consulting and assemblying (US$1.4 million). Th
ese 16 companies" 
investments represent 57% of the engineering se
ctor's overseas 
investments, and have gone mostly to establishment
 of subsidiaries 
either in the countries where services are rendered 
or in tax havens. 
In cne case, mentioned above, the investmen
t refers to a steel 
company (Acepar), in a turn-key operation by 
a engineering firm 
(Tenenge) and by a Brazilian steel company (Cofe
rraz). 
as was the case in the manufacturing sector, the
 information 
from the reports of companies belonging to 187 lo
cal business groups 
offers a more extensive view of the overseas activ
ities of some of 
the Brazilian engineering companies. For the b
iggest investor in 
this sector (Mendes Júnior), this information sh
ows that, besides 
investments in Uruguay and the Caribbean, this c
onstruction company 
also has subsidiaries in Argentina and Algeria, c
ontrolled by the 
Caribbean subsidiary. Further information onthe 
third largest 
investor (Gomes de Almeida) reveals the existen
ce of subsidiaries 
in the US and in Paraguay that remain unlisted b
y the Central Bank. 
Ogebrecht, a major construction firm for which the
 Central Bank 
reveals only US$5,000 of investments in the Cari
bbean, appears with 
91% cf the stock of a subsidiary in Paraguay and 6
6% of a joint 
venture in Chile. Finally, Veplan,with no investmen
ts registered in 
the Central Bank, shows up here with wholly-owned
 subsidiaries in 
is 
the US, Paraguay and Chile, as well as 35% of
 the capital of a 
second subsidiary in this latter country. 
1.3 - Overseas investments by State-owned firms 
The register of Brazilian State-owned firms orga
nized by 
the Secretary of Planning is an additional inform
ation source on 
tne activities of Brazilian companies abroad. While
 it does not 
reveal the value of the State-owned firms'
 overseas investments, 
it does furnish the number and sectors of foreign 
companies in 
which these firms participate, as well as the na
ture of this 
participation. 
This register, which does not include foreign agenc
ies 
of government banks, reveals that there are 25 com
panies abroad 
with direct or indirect investments by Brazilian S
tate-owned firms: 
17 commercial companies, four financial companies, two 
oil 
companies, two shipping companies and one company i
nvolved in 
Brazil's nuclear program. Of the 25, 17 are estab
lished in developed 
countries, seven in tax havens and one in the Middle
 East. Nearly 
all of them are part of the groups led by the Ban
co do Brasil, by 
petrobrás and by Vale do Rio Doce. There are only thr
ee cases where 
the State-owned company does not directly or indir
ectly wholly cwn 
the subsidiary: two commercial companies, each of 
them held 50% 
by Petrcbrãs and 50% by a local private firm, and 
a shipping company, 
50% of which is controlled by Vale do Rio Doce. 
This profile of the State-owned firms' subsidiar
ies 
reflects the nature of their overseas expansion. 
Their dynamic is 
generally tied to export efforts or to initiati
ves that complement 
the Brazilian firm's main activity. Only some of pe
trobrás" 
subsidiaries represent an overseas extension of
 the company's main 
activity. Petrobrás! activities abroad also include 
exploration 
contracts, which will be examined below.
12. 
2. Industrial technology and engineering 
service exports 
By Brazilian law, in order to make paymen
ts abroad for 
the import of technology, the contr
acts under which payment is made 
must first be approved and registered in 
the National Institute 
of Industrial Property and in the Central
 Bank. These records, along 
with the exchange operation statistics co
mpiled by the latter agency, 
provide considerable information on the f
low of technology 
transferred into the country. While the da
ta is not elaborated 
systematically by the agencies that have 
access to the information, 
tnere is at least the possibility of a s
atisfactory estimation of 
the magnitude and nature of the inflow of 
technology. 
Unfortunately, the situation regard
ing technology exports 
is completely different. The only systemati
c information available 
comes from exchange operation statistics co
mpiled in the process of 
drawing up the balance of payments. Even t
his source, however, is 
of limited value and should be vieweã with
 caution. The forms filed 
for exchange operations and used for the 
compilation of these 
statistics are scrutinized much less rigo
rously than in the case 
of technology imports, not only because th
e auditing is looser 
(since they involve revenue for the country
) but also because they 
ão not refer to a previously registered con
tract. In addition to 
these operational difficulties, this sourc
e obviously does not 
include the earnings perceived by Brazilia
n firms abroad and not 
remitted to the country. 
Therefore, there is no systematic 
information on the 
Brazilian firms exporting technology, or,
 on the main characteristics 
of their exports revenue. A more precise s
tudy of Brazil's technology 
exports thus demands a comprehensive surve
y to indentify the 
exporters and obtain the necessary informa
tion. An alternative is 
to derive data on these exports from scat
tered sources of information, 
complemented by interviews in a small samplin
g of companies. Our 
procedure was the latter one, and the resu
lts are presented in the 
following sections. We indentified 58 manufa
cturing firms responsible 
for 112 overseas operations during the 1976-
81 period, 84 engineering 
firms accounting for 261 contracts between 
1975-83 and 22 construction 
companies that executed 67 contracts durin
g the 1970-83 period. 
«13. 
Furthermore, the above-mentioned shortcomings call for 
caution in the evaluation of the evolution of technology exp
ort 
revenues reported by the balance of payments (Table 10). 
The time series derived from published balance-of-payments 
information reveals a rising trend from 1970 on, increasing from 
us$ 9 million in 1969 to US$ 136 million in 1975, 
and a reaching a 
peak of US$ 372 million in 1981, followed by a substantial dec
line 
to US$ 300 million in 1982. This evolution means annual growth r
ates 
of 25.5% from 1969-81, 11.1% from 1970-81 and 8.5% from 1975-B1.
 
These figures, however, include revenues for administrative serv
ices 
which, strictly speaking, should not be considered as resulting
 
from the export of technology. Unfortunately, the information
 
available only allows for identification of the magnitude of the 
administrative service revenue from 1979 on, when it accounted
 for 
between 57% and 70% of the total balance-of-payments figures. 
Therefore, the volume of technology exports alone is thereby 
reduced to US$ 99 million in 1979, US$ 100 million in 1980, US$ 
159 
million in 1981 and US$ 88 million in 1982. 
we did manage to obtain a breakdown of the balance-of- 
payment figures for the last ten years, but the criteria for 
classification was altered in 1979, meaning that the breakdown 
for 
the 1973-78 period is not perfectly comparable to the figures 
for 
more recent years. The first classification system distinguished 
revenues derived from: a) trade marks and patents; b) industr
ial 
projects, models and designs; c) administrative services and 
technical assistance. The new system classifies revenues as coming 
from: a) trade marks and patents; b) specialized technical services; 
c) technical-industrial cooperation and supply of industrial 
technology; d) administrative services. 
Thus it is only possible to establish a ten-year (1973-82) 
time series for revenues from trade marks and patents (the value
s 
are both very low and quite stable). The other items broken out 
until 1978 are of limited use not only because technical assis
tance 
and administrative services are grouped together but also becaus
e 
the limits between this item and that of industrial projects, mode
ls
«l4. 
and designs are very vague. Thug the sharp growth in the values 
assigned to this latter item in 1977 may simply reflect changes in 
the classification procedures. The criteria adopted in 1979, 
however, seem more revealing, showing for example that specialized 
technical services account for almost the entirety of the revenue, 











2.1 - Manufacturing firms and the export of industrial technology 
This section is based on a recent study by Sercovich 
(1983) which presents the results of a field survey on Brazilian 
technology exports. It is worth noting that the period covered by 
this study (1976-81) is not the same as the one used in the inventory 
of engineering service exports (1975/83) and the overseas activities 
of construction companies (1970-83), to be presented in the following 
sections. 
The Sercovich study identified 58 companies exporting 
industrial technology during the period under consideration, in 112 
separate operations (Table 11). Of the 58, nearly half (27) produce 
capital goods, accounting for 69 operations. The capital goods 
manufacturers are thus more active than other companies exporting 
industrial technology; the average number of operations per firm is 
2.6 in the first group and 1.4 in the second. 
As for the nature of technology exported, those relating 
to the machinery and to the sugar and alcohol sectors each account 
for 25% of the surveyed operations. In both cases, the exporters 
are almost exclusively capital goods producers. Following in order 
of importance. are technologies used in the steel industry and in the 
food processing, beverages and tobacco sector, each accounting for 
about 15% of all operations. In these cases, however, the technology 
suppliers are mostly firms active in the same sectors, rather than 
capital goods producers. This predominance of technology users is 
even more accentuated in terms of know-how for the chemical industry 
and for the metallurgical, cement and building materials industries 
(grouped under the item “"others"). Capital goods producers do stand 
15. 
out, however, in exports of technology for 
paper and cellulose. 
The study also distinguishes between three ty
pes of 
industrial technology exports: engineering, 
consulting and technical 
assistance; turn-key plant sales; and licensin
g. The first group 
ist the largest in terms of the number of o
perations (54) and of 
the number of exporters (35). There are 38 turn-key
 operations 
involving 16 firms, and 20 licensing operations 
involving 15 
Brazilian companies. 
Most of the turn-key operations refer to install
ations for 
the sugar and alcohol industry and were 
generally carried out by 
capital goods producers. The picture for lice
nsing operations is 
different not only in that no particular secto
r stands out but 
also in the fact that nearly all the Brazilian 
firms involved are 
licensed technology users. The engineering, c
onsulting and 
technical assistance operations are mainly i
n the machinery and 
in the steel industries. In addition, 
most of these operations were 
carried out by companies that also use the e
xported technology. 
Indeed, if we exclude the technology used in 
the machinery industry 
— where the users also produce capital goods 
— we see that these 
producers account for only 12 out of a total
 of 37 operations. 
In short, these results show, first 
of all, the importance 
of capital goods producers in the number of i
ndustrial technology 
export operations. Their activity mainly invo
lves the transfer of 
technology within the machinery industry, and 
to the sugar and 
alcohol and the paper and cellulose sectors. 
In the case of sugar 
and alcohol, the predominant form of operation 
is the turn-key sale 
of plants; and, in the other cases, operations 
mainly involve 
engineering, consulting and technical assist
ence. The results also 
reveal, however, that the capital goods prod
ucers are not alone in 
the export of industrial technology. Actually,
 in the steel industry, 
the food, beverage and tobacco sector, t
he chemical industry and 
the metallurgical, cement and building materials sect
ors, most 
overseas operations involve companies that actually e
mploy the 
exported technology. Inthese cases, the exports 
mostly take the 




2.2 - Engineering firms and the export of services 
The following discussion on the nature and extent of the 
overseas activities of Brazilian engineering firms is based on our 
own survey of periodicals and, especially, of specialized magazines. 
while our survey probably offers an incomplete picture of these 
activities, it does permit an overall evaluation of the movement 
of 
engineering companies towards the external market during the late 
seventies. 
The survey identified 93 engineering firms with overseas 
activities between 1975-83. They were responsible for 297 contracts 
in 40 different countries. (*) 
Most of these contracts were in Latin American countries 
(192 contracts, 65% of the total), the most important of which were 
Paraguay (58 contracts), Uruguay (36), Chile (22), Peru (15), 
eolivia (17) and Ecuador (15), which together account for 87% of 
the contracts in this region. In Africa and the Middle East (with 
17% and 8%, respectively, of all contracts), the most important 
countries were Nigeria (25 contracts), Mozambique (11), Algeria (11) 
and Irag (8). 
The activities of the engineering firms were grouped into 
three categories: consulting, design and technical assistance 
activities; assembling services; and auxiliary engineering services. 
Table 12 presents the activities of the 93 firms mentioned above in 
each of these categories: 57 of them are active in consulting abroad, 
with 192 contracts in 34 differente countries; 23 companies were 
contracted for 63 assembling jobs in 16 countries; and 18 carried 
out 42 auxiliary engineering service contracts in 18 countries. 
The presence of State-owned and of foreign subsidiaries 
among the 93 engineering firms is not expressive: among the consulting 
firms, there are two foreign subsidiaries with eleven contracts and 
(*) We did not include architecture and urban design projects. The 93 companies 
were responsible for 14 of thee projects. During the survey we also 
identified eleven companies whose overseas activities were strictly limited 
to this type of project (35 contracts). 
at. 
one State-owned firm with three contracts ; among the assembling 
companies, there are four foreign-owned (15 contracts) and one 
State-owned (4 contracts) companies; as for special engineering 
services, there is one foreign firm with two contracts and two 
State-owned companies with seven contracts. Of the total, foreign 
subsidiaries and State-owned firms account, respectively, for only 
9.4% and 4,7% of the contracts. 
Table 13 presents the evolution of the overseas activities 
of engineering firms, revealing an expansion throughout the 1975-83 
period. (*) This trend seems to have been reversed, however, from 
1981 on in the case of consulting, design and technical assistance 
contracts. Since the overseas activities of the engineering 
companies involve mainly developing countries, this set-back may be 
attributed to increasing economic difficulties (especially in terms 
of the balance of payments) experienced by these countries in the 
early eighties. 
The following discussion looks separately at each of the 
categories we have mentioned, 
Consulting, design and technical assistance contracts 
The overseas consulting, design and technical assistance 
activities by Brazilian engineering firms between 1975-83 involved 
57 firms, 192 contracts and 34 differente countries. 
These contracts are highly concentrated. In fact, the 
15 firms most active abroad account for 121 contracts (63% of the 
total), of which 41 contracts were carried out by the top two 
(Hidroservice and Promon). The other 42 firms had an average of 
only 1.7 contracts (Table 14). 
  
(*) The results may be somewhat imprecise, since it was not always possible 
to determine the exact moment when the overseas activity began. In any 
case, whatever errors there are restricted to a one-year interval. 
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There is a clear predominance of the Brazilian largest 
consulting firms in the export of services during this period. In 
fact, Hidroservice and Promon are precisely the two largest firms 
in the sector, with sales of approximately US$ 117 million and 
us$ 102 million, respectively, in 1982, In addition, all of the ten 
largest Brazilian consulting firms (with 1982 sales within the 
range US$ 28-117 million) had overseas activities during the period 
1975-83, and among them carried out a total of 63 contracts. Of the 
firms classified from llth to 20th place in 1982 sales, seven were 
contracted for overseas services (25 contracts). . 
As for the geographic spread of the consulting activities, 
most of the firms (40) restricted their overseas operations to one 
or two countries (Table 15). Of the six most widely spread companies 
(in five or more countries), five are among the 20 largest in the 
sector, with the largest one — Hidroservice — being involved in the 
largest number of countries (12). 
Nearly all the exports of consulting, design and technical 
assistance services go to developing countries (Table 16). Most go 
to Latin America, with 67% of the total, followed by Africa (20%) 
and the Middle East (8%). Within each of these regions, the contracts 
are concentrated in certain countries. Thus, within Latin America, 
five countries — Paraguay (33 contracts), Uruguay (19), Chile (17), 
Bolivia and Peru — are responsible for 72% of the services 
contracted in the region; in Africa, 87% of the contracts go to 
Nigeria (21 contracts), Mozambique and Tanzania; and in the Middle 
East nearly all services are exported to Algeria and Irag. 
The five Latin American coúntries mentioned are also the 
ones where the largest number of Brazilian consulting firms are 
present. We thus find 16 different Brazilian companies in Paraguay, 
13 in Uruguay, 12 in Chile, 8 in Peru and 7 in Bolivia. Nigeira 
stands out in the other regions, hosting 9 Brazilian companies. 
Consulting, design and technical assistance activities 
carried out abroad by Brazilian firms cover a broad range of 







(37 contracts in 16 countries, involving 17
 Brazilian firms), 
construction of dams and hydroele
ctric plants (38 contracts, 14 
countries and 15 companies), manufacturing
 and processing plants 
(39 contracts, 16 countries and 20 co
mpanies) and water systems (26 
contracts, 11 countries and 13 co
mpanies). These services account 
for 73% of the contracts. 
Industrial technology contracts are co
ncentrated in the 
paper and pulp sector (10 contracts) and 
in steel (9). Of the steel 
contracts, though, eight are part of a 
single project in Paraguay 
— a joint venture between private Brazilia
n capital and a Paraguayan 
government holding company . while the 
paper and pulp contracts are 
spread around seven countries, nine of 
the ten were carried out 
by a single company, actually a subsid
iary of a Finnish firm. The 
other industrial technology exports invo
lved six contracts in food 
processing and agroindustry, three con
tracts in coal mining and 
processing and two in chemical plants, a
s well as contracts for a 
foundry, two cement plants and a ceramic
 factory. 
Assembling services 
Twenty-three Brazilian engineering firms 
carried out 63 
assembling service contracts in 16 diffe
rente countries during the 
1975-83 period. As was the case in consu
lting activities, the two 
most active firms in overseas jobs (SADE
, a foreign company, with 
eleven contracts, and Tenenge with six,are 
among the largest in the 
sector, occupying respectively third and 
first places in sales and 
second and first in net assets (the two ha
d sales of approximately 
US$ 289 million and US$ 180 million in 1
982, covering both 
assembling and construction services in each 
case). In addition, 
the sector's six largest firms had overseas
 activities during the 
period under consideration, and were respo
nsible for 44% of the 
contracts. Ten of the sixteen companies exp
orting services are among 
the twenty largest in the sector. 
Twenty of the assembling service exporters 
limited their 
activities abroad to one or two countries; 
the most diversified 
firm — SADE — had contracts in nine countrie
s (Table 15). Nearly
.20. 
all the services were carried out in Latin America (57 contracts), 
the main countries here being Uruguay (15 contracts) and Paraguay 
(13). These are also the countries where the largest number of 
Brazilian firms were present (11 and 7, respectively) (Table 16). 
A breakdown of the assembling service contracts shows 
that most were for electricity distribution systems (24 contracts 
in 11 countries, involving 7 Brazilian companies), manufacturing 
andprocessing plants (15 contracts, 6 companies and 7 countries) ] 
and hydroelectric plants (8 contracts, 7 countries and 4 companies) 
(Table 18). Industrial assembling jobs were mostly in the steel 
(5 contracts) and in the paper and pulp industries (two contracts). 
As in consulting activities, all steel industry assembling services 
were for a single project in Paraguay. 
Auxiliary engineering services 
The remaining engineering services carried out by 
Brazilian firms between 1975-83 (involving 18 companies and 42 
contracts) included mainly aerial surveys (15 contracts) and soil 
and foundation engineering (18 contracts). 
Fourteen of these 18 service exporters carried out only 
one or two overseas contracts during this period. The most active 
one — Geotêcnica — had seven contracts for soil and foundation 
engineering in six different countries; its overseas activities 
actually included five consulting and design contracts in two 
countries as well. 
Latin American countries accounted for 25 of the auxiliary 
engineering service contracts, twelve of which were carried out in 
Paraguay. Africa and the Middle East received significantly fewer 
contracts (eleven and six, respectively). 
2.3 - Overseas activities of the construction firms 
As in the preceeding section, the description of Brazilian 
construction firms' activities abroad is based on our own survey of   
sado 
specialized magazines, the press in general and interviews. It 
probably gives an incomplete picture of these companies' activities 
abroad. Note that, contrary to the preceeding section, our results 
here include the construction of buildings and cover a longer 
period (1970-83). 
The survey found 27 firms, responsible for 74 contracts 
in 22 differente countries during the period. The progression of 
these companies! overseas activities (Table 23) shows a significant 
increase in the number of contracts in 1977, after which there is 
no defined tendency over time. 
Mendes Júnior stands out as the most active firm abroad, 
with 15 contracts; eleven firms carried out between three and five 
overseas contracts and the other fifteen,only one or two jobs 
outside Brazil. Mendes Júnior is also the most wide-spread of the 
companies geographically,operating in six differente countries. 
Andrade Gutierrez is second, active in four countries. Among the 
others, twenty were restricted to a single country, three had 
contracts in two countries and three others in three differente 
countries. 
All the five largest firms of the sector in sales (from 
US$ 233 million to US$ 1.210 billion in 1982) and six of the seven 
largest in net assets (from US$ 158 to 617 million in 1982) carried 
out overseas contracts between 1970-83. In this ranking, Mendes 
Júnior is third in net assets (US$ 560 million) and fourth in sales 
(US$ 654 million). 
Table 20, however, shows that not only the big companies 
took to the overseas markets during this period. Three of the 27 
firms with overseas activities are between llth and 20th places in 
the net assets ranking; six fall between 2lst and 30th places, three 
between 31lst and 50th places and two between 51 st and 100th. 
Finally, the two smallest firms are numbers 103 and 108, with 
approximately US$ 4,5 million each in net assets. In addition, the 
average number of contracts per firm does not vary significantly 
from one stratum to another. In fact, if we exclude Mendes Júnior 
from the first group, the average (2,2) is actually lower than the
«2%. 
average figure for the 27 firms as a whole (2.9). 
The picture changes radically, however, if we consider the 
value of the contracts. While we were unable to gather these 
figures for engineering services, here it was possible to obtain 
information on the value of 57 of the contracts involving construction 
firms, among them all the contracts signed by the six largest 
companies in the sector. 
The two largest contracts, according to available 
information (both worth US$ 1.2 billion for construction of a dam 
in Venezuala and a railway in Iraq), involve, respectively, a 
consortium of Camargo Correia and Cetenco (the largest and the fifth 
largest in the sector, by net assets) and Mendes Júnior. Of the next 
seven largest contracts — from US$ 200 to 400 million — two were 
undertaken by Mendes Júnior, one by Andrade Gutierrez and another 
by Odebrecht (respectively the second and seventh largest by net 
assets), two by Rabello (a company that, while located above 40th 
place in the net assets ranking, was a pioneer in the movement into 
foreign markets) and one by Paranapanema (located in the second 
stratum). 
The six largest firms active overseas had contracts worth 
a total of US$ 4.7 billion (Table 20). Moreover, the average value 
of these companies! contracts (US$ 181 million) is significantly 
higher than the figures for the other size groups, except for 
Rabello's. (*) 
The geographical spread of the construction firms shows 
that Latin America (45 contracts), the Middle East (16 contracts) 
and Africa (12 contracts) account for nearly all services rendered 
(Table 21). In Latin America, Paraguay stands out with both the 
largest number of contracts (15) and the presence of the largest 
number of Brazilian firms (8). In the Middle East, most of the 
contracts went to Algeria and Iraq (8 and 5). In Africa, a third 
of the contracts were in Mauritania, 
(*) Note, however, that information is available on only two of Rabello's five 
contracts. 
123. 
The dollar figures on this spread show a different picture. 
However, they give a distorted image since the percentage of the 
contracts for which information on value is available varied from 
one country to another. The highest rate of unknown values fell to 
Paraguay and Algeria, 
Among the 57 contracts whose values are known, the total 
value is about evenly distributed between the Middle East (37.08), 
Latin America (33.54) and Africa (29.5%). Contracts in the first 
two regions, however, are very highly concentrated in a single 
country: 57% of the total value of known Latin American contracts 
refer to one project in Venezuela, while 71% of the value of the 
Middle East contracts is concentrated in Irag. In Africa, N
igeria 
and Angola account, respectively, for 31% and 27% of the 
total value 
of the region's contracts. It is worth emphasizing also that six 
oil-exporting countries contracted construction services worth a 
total of US$ 4,724 billion, 74% of the total. 
Distortions caused by unknown figures, however, tend to 
diminish in importance when we consider the average value per 
contract. In this regard, the Middle East (US$ 262.1 million) 
and Africa (US$ 156.7 million) stand head and shoulders over Latin 
America (US$ 59.3 million). Here, though, the real distinction seems 
to be between the six oil-exporters and the other 21 countries,
 with 
the first group displaying an average value nine times higher than 
the second (US$337 million and US$ 38 million, respectively). 
Looking at the types of overseas projects, we find that 
highway and railroad construction involve the largest number of 
jobs (123 contracts), countries (10) and Brazilian firms 
(11) (Table 22). Next in importance are water systems (13 contracts, 
6 firms and 7 countries) and dams and hydroelectric plants (11 
contracts, 5 firms and 9 countries). Interestingly, the types of 
contracts vary significangly between Latin America, on the one hand, 
and Africa and the Middle East,on the other. Thus, almost all the 
projects involving dams and hydroelectric plants, ports and airports 
and water systems were carried out in Latin America. On the other 
hand, construction of industrial installations and buildings 
were
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overwhelmingly concentrated in the Middle East and Africa. Highway 
and railroad contracts were the only ones which were 
about evenly distributed between Latin American countries and those 
in Africa and the Middle East. 
Considering the values of each type of contract, the most 
expensive jobs on the average were industrial construction projects; | 
but only one project was identified here. Next come dams and 
hydroelectric plants and highways and railroads, whose average costs j 
were, respectively, US$ 211 million and US$ 167 million. When, in . , 
both cases, we exclude the 1.2-billion-dollar contracts, the average 
values both drop to about US$105 million, still significantly above 
the figures for construction jobs involving ports and airports, 
water systems and buildings. 
3 - Petrobras' Activities Abroad 
Petrobras, the state-owned oil enterprise, is among the 
Brazilian firms one of the most active abroad. Its activities have 
been carried on by a special subsidiary — Braspetro — incorporated 
in 1972 and responsible for the development, outside of Brazil, of 
exploration, production, industrialization, commerce, transportation 
and stocking of oil and its products, as well as for the execution 
of technical and administrative services related to these activities. 
Braspetro's activities has included fourteen countries so 
far. Exploration contracts have already been accomplished in 
Madagascar, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Philippines, Colombia, Algeria and 
Lybia; currently, Braspetro is engaged in exploration contracts 
in Algeria, Lybia, Guatemala, Angola, Congo and People's Democratic 
Republic of Yemen. These contracts were frequently undertaken in 
association with other companies — mostly, with local state-owned 
enterprises (as in Iran, Egypt, Colombia, Algeria, Iraq, Angola and 
Congo)-but also with large multinational oil producers (as Texaco, 
Mobil Oil, Cities Services, British Petroleum, Elf Aquitaine and 
Total). In seven of its exploration contracts, Braspetro was the 
operator. 
25. 
In addition, Braspetro has participated, as an 
early 
participant, in the Geophysical Prospection A
greement in seven 
offshore blocks in China, as well as submitt
ing proposals to a 
bidding opened by China National Offshore Oi
l Company, in association 
with British Petroleum, Brokel Hill Proprietar
y, Petrocanada and 
Ranger Oil. 
Braspetro has established two joint ventures abr
oad: one 
in Colombia, in which it holds 50% of cap
ital, and a second one in 
Angola, in association with the State-owned comp
any (Sonangol) and 
petrofino, to act as the operator in a new explorati
on area in 
which Braspetro will hold interests. 
Furthermore, Braspetro has technical assistan
ce agreements 
with State-owned oil firms in Irag and Trinidad
-Tobago (rendering 
services in the fields of geology, geophysical
 processing and 
drilling, and production and instalation engine
ering), as well as a 
service contract with the Italian company Agip
 to carry out drilling 
work in Lybia. 
As a result of these activities, Braspetro shipped 806 
thousand barrels of oil from Angola (86%), Algeri




TABLE 1, TABLE 2 
BRAZILIAN EXPORTS - 1965/1982 








Total goods Total good 
Authorized (a) Effective (b) Direct 
a im qe 
Nominal Real Nominal  Real'f) ini 
1965 1595 130 5 043 411 
1968 1 881 203 5 496 593 
1965 0.1 0.3 
1970 2 739 416 7 428 1 128. 
1966 0.2 0.6 
1971 2 904 573 7 624 1 504 
1967 0.5 1,5 
1972 3 991 589 10 031 2 257 
1968 0.4 e 2 5.8 66 
1973 6 199 1434 13 780 3 188 
1969 2.1 5.9 12 33,7 81 
1974 7 951 2 263 14 871 4 233 
1970 5.4 14.6 14 38.0 146 
1975 8 670 2 584 14 844 4 424 
1971 2.8 7.4 1 2.6 69 
1976 10 128 2 77% 16 566 4 541 
1972 18.1 45.5 19 48 33 
1977 12 120 3 840 — 18 6% 5 917 
1973 19.5 43.3 37 82 977 
1978 12 659 5 083 18 098 7 269 
1974 58.3 109.0 61 114 945 
1979 15244 6 645 19 364 8 441 
1975 92.1 157.7 128 219 1106 
1980 20 132 9 041 22 422 10 072 
1976 50.2 82.1 196 321 1145 
1981 23 293 11 884 23 784 12 135 
1977 148.3 228.5 164 253 935 
1982 20 175 10 225 20 175 10 225 
1978 51.6 73.8 135 193 1196 
1979 - 108.9 138.3 200 254 1685 
Annual growth 
1980 165.3 184.1 366 408 1512 
nata 
1981 195.5 199.6 211 215 1905 
1965-1970 11.4 26.8 8.1 22.4 
1982 193.3 193.3 382 382 1511 
1970-1975 25.9 44.0 14.8 31.4 
1975-1980 18.4 28.4 8.6 17.9 ; 1965/1976 259.7 
469.1 
1970-1982 18.1 30.6 8.7 20.2 ' 1977/1982 
862.9 1017.6 1458 1705 8744 
1965/1982 1112.6 1486.7 
Source: Banco Central do Brasil - Relatório, several issues. Boletim à censal “
E and Diario Oficial al 
Source: Bole lo Banco al, several issues jario Oficial, 
sever: 
(a) Deflated by the U.S. wholesale price index (1982 = 100). 
issues. , 
(a) Authorization certificates issued by the Central Bank.
 
(b) Balance of payment data. 
(c) Deflated by the U.S. wholesale price index (1982 = 100) 




US$ million (percentage) 
BRAZILIAN DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD BY INVESTING SECTOR - 
1977-1982 
 
Financial Oil Manufacturing Engineer 
. ; ; ing Camerce Others 
Institutions Firms Firms Fi 
1977 31.9 106.0 3.0 0.3 2.6 4.6 
(21.5) (71.4) (2.0) (0.2) (1.9) (3.0) 
1978 45.2 -=" 4.3 1.5 0.5 a 
' (87.7) - (8.4) (2.9) (0.9) = 
(b) 
1979 42.1 10.0 42.3 1.0 10.6 2.5 
(38.8) (9.2) (39,0) (0.9) (9.8) (2.3) 
1980 78.5 60.0 16.4 0.7 1.4 83 
(47.5) (36.3) (8.9) (0.4) (0.9) (5.0) 
1981 96.4 20.0 53.00) 12.1 6.0 8.1 
(49.3) (10.2) (27.1) (6.2) (3.1) (4,1) 
1982 96.1 42.0 19.2 16.4 9.1 10.6 
(49.7) (21.7) (9.9) (8.5) (4.7) (5.5) 
Total 390.2 238.0 138.3 31.9 30.2 33.9 
(45.3) (27.6) (16.0) (3.5) (3.5) (3.9) 
+25. 
TABLE d 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF BRAZILIAN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
ABROAD BY RECEIVING COUNTRIES - 1965/76 and 1977/8212) 
  
SOURCE: Diário Oficial, several issues. 
single firm. 
(a) According to authorization certificates issued by the Central Bank. 
(b) US$35 million in 1979 and US$30 million in 1981 were invested by a 
1965/1976 1977/82 TOTAL 
Ceveloped Countries 82.3 58.8 64.0 
Latin America 10.5 22.6 18.9 
Tax Havens 6.1 17.2 14.7 
Others 1.1 1.4 1.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
SOURCE: Diário Oficial, several issues and unpublished data. 




BRAZILIAN DIRECT INVESTMENT 'ABROAD BY INVESTING SECTOR AND 
RECEIVING COUNTRIES - 1977/1982 82) 
US$ million (percentage) 
  
Developed Latin Tax 
Countries America Havens Others Total 
Financial 
institutions 221.4 123.9 32 Ter 390.3 
(56.7 (L,7) (9.5) (2.0) (100.0) 
Oil firms 228.0 - 10.0 - 238.0 
(95.8) - (4.2) - (100.0) 
Manufacturing 
firms 26.9 41.1 68.7 1.5 138.3 
(19.5) (29.7) (49.7) (1.1) (100.0) 
Engineering 
firms 4.1 ELO 15,5 13: 31.9 
(12.9) (34.5) (48.6) (4.1) (100.0) 
Commerce 11.8 32.5 3.5 2.0 30.2 
(39.1) (41,4) (12,9) (6.6) (100.0) 
Others 14,9 6.0 13.0 - 33.9 
(44.0) (17.7) (38.3) = (100.0) 
Total 507.2 194.5 148.3 125 B62.5 
(58.8) (22.6) (172) (1.4) (100.0) 
SOURCE: Diário Oficial, several issues 





FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD 
PER MANUFACTURING FIRM - 1977/1982/2) 
 
  
Direct Investment Inves tment 
persa Prequenoy "ocmulated Accumlated (US$1000) frequency US$1000 Percentage Percentage 
15000 «x L 1 65,000 47.0 47.0 
5000 <x <15000 2. 3 26,536 19.2 66.2 
1000 <x < 5000 18 21 31,837 23.0 89.2 
500 <x < 1000 6 27 3,689 2.1 91.9 
250 xx < 500 15 42 6,045 4.4 96.3 
100 <x< 250 2 63 2,950 21 98.4 
50 sx < 100 19 82 1,207 0.9 99.3 
x < 50 41 123 2,015 0.7 100.0 
TOTAL 123 138,284 100.0 
SOURCE: Diário Oficial, several issues. 
(a) According to authorization certificates issued by the Central Bank.
“JB 
TABLE 7 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT OF BRAZILIAN MANUFACTURING 






Developed Latin Tax 
Commirice Manica Hávens Others Total Investing 
Firms 
Non Metalic 
Minerals 4.476 1.465 4.941 4 
Metallurgy 1.530 15.330 16.860 8 
Machinery 2.883 2.862 1.000 ovas) agtb) 
Electrical (c) (c) 
Equipment 12.692 7.189 19.881 !€ hi 
ia (a) (à) Equipment 1.902 1.345 500 3.747 7 
Tirber and 
Furniture 284 210 494 2 
Plastic 
Material ts 1.100 é.328 2 
Textile and 
apparel 4.889 328 250 5.467 5 
Leather 618 618 2 
Food 
Processing 2.159 5.165 65.100 73.424 7 
Others 300 698 100 1.098 6 
Total 26.973 38.900 68.260 1.465 135.598) 3!) 
Eça 24 37 6 1 - - Investing Firms 
SOURCE: Diario Oficial, several issues, 
(a) According to authorization certificates issued by the Central Bark. Includes 
manufacturing firms which invested more than US$100 thousand during the pe- 
riod 1977/1982. 
(b) Includes two foreignfirms which invested US$697 thousand (US$672 thousand in 
Latin America) 
(c) Includesone foreign firm which invested US$2,362 thousand in Latin America. 
(d) Includestwo foreign firms which invested US$706 thousand in Latin America and 
one State enterprise which invested one million dollars. 




FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD 
PER ENGINEERING FIRM - 1977/1982!2) 
 
  = Tavestemt K Accumulated nene a 
(US$1000) U5$1000  Percentage porcentage 
5000 < x 3 3 21,602 67.7 67.7 
1000 < x < 5000 3 6 6,500 20.4 88.1 
250 < * <1000 5 11 2,349 na. 95.4 
100 <x< 250 8 19 1,141 3.6 99.0 
* < 100 14 33 313 1.0 100.0 
Total 33 31,905 100.0 
SOURCE: Diário Oficial, several issues. 




FIRMS BY RECEIVING COUNTRIES - 1977/1982/2) 




E Number of 
Developed Latin Tax 
Comtries: Arica Havens Others Total Investing 
Firms 
Building 
Construction 4,000 313 7,000 247 11,560 5 (b) 
Large É 
Construction 266 10,560 7,112 730 18,668 10. , 
Assembling 974 974 2(c) 
Consulting 
and Design 250 140 390 2 
Total 4,266 11,847 14,362 Ldlt7 31,59% 19 
Number of 
Investing 
Firms 8 7 4 
SOURCE: Diário Oficial, several issues. 
(a) According to authorization certificates issued by the Central Bank. Includet 
Brazilian firms which invested more than US$100 thousand during the period 
1977/1982. 
(b) Includes ane foreign firm which invested US$1,500 thousand in Caribe. 
(c) Inckxdes ane foreign firm which invested US$140 thousand in Latin America. 
3h 
TABLE 10 
BRAZILIAN TECHNOLOGY EXPORTS - 1965/1982 
 
 
Patents Specialized Industrial foninis- ao 
and Design engineering technology services services Total Total 
trade- services supply and (a) 
marks technical 
assistance 
1966 5 15 
1967 13 39 
1968 9 26 
1969 9 25 
1970 44 119 
1971 40 105 
1972 53 133 
1973 6 3 7 86 191 
1974 6 1 103 10 208 
1975 8 1 127 136 233 
1976 8 1 123 132 216 
1977 6 58 121 185 285 
1978 6 63 153 222 317 
1979 7 90 aê 154 253 321 
1980 8 89 3 194 294 355 
1981 9 141 4 213 372 380 
1982 6 81 i 212 300 300 
Source: Central Bank (unpublished data). 















































BRAZIL: ENGINEERING SERVICE EXPORTS - 1975/1983 (2) 
Total 
jects, which were not camputed. Eleven other firms are respon- 
were not included in the classes above. 
sible for 35 architectural projects. 
  
    
(a) Numbers between brackets indicate suppliers or countries which 
(b) The 57 suppliers are also responsible for 14 architectural 
Consulting and design 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 15 TABLE 16 
| FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF THE NUMBER OF COUNTRIES DISTRIBUTION OF ENGINEERING SERVICE EXPORTS BY 
IN WHICH ENGINEERING FIRMS HAVE OPERATED RECEIVING COUNTRIES - 1975/1983 
design engineering ea Engineering Total Consulting Other services 
Number of and À design Assenbling engineering Total Suppliers aa Suppliers a Suppliers Ea Countries engineering firms services 
firms Paraguay 16 33 7 13 7 12 58 
Uruguay 13 19 11 15 2 2 36 1 3 u nu 48 Chile 12 17 2 5 22 
2 11 9 3 20 Peru 8 LL 3 5 3 3 19 
4 g ã E 14 Bolivia 7 13 4 4 17 
Colombia 5 5 I T 6 
4 2 - - - Argentina 2 3 4 4 3 10 ' i g E 6 Ecuador 4 7 3 5 15 
6 - - 2 1 Venezuela 2 5 3 3 9 
Salvador 2 2 2 3 = E - 1 Guatemala 3 4 4 8 1 ms = iai Panama 2 2 2 
Mexico 1 1 1 ” + o ” Dominican Rep. 1 1 ã 1 3 
12 dl; - E 1 Costa Rica E L 1 
Nicaragua T 1 1 
Total 57 23 18 93 ia aa : : , 
| Latin America 129 57 25 211 
, Mauritania 1 É 1 1 2 
Nigeria 9 21 1 1 3 3 25 
Mozambique 6 9 2 2 1 
, Tanzania 3 3 1 1 4 
Others 4 4 2 2 a 4 10 
Africa 38 3 nos 
Algeria 9 7 1 E 1 
Iraq 6 T 1 1 i 8 
Libya - - 3 3 3 
Others 2 2 1 E 3 
Midale East 15 ê 6 25 
Others 7 8 1 E 5 
TOTAL 57 192 8 63 18 42 297 
TABLE 17 
SERVICE EXPORTS BY CONSULTING AND DESIGN 
— ENGINEERING FIRMS BY TYPE OF WORK 
 
Suppliers Contracts Countries 
Countries with more than 
one supplier and/or 
contract 
Dars and hydroelectric 
plants 



























Algeria (3-4) Uruguai (5-8) 
Mozambique (2-3), 
Paraguay (2-3) ,Chile(5), 
Bolivia(2) Tanzania(2), 
Peru(2) Venezuela (2), 
Ecuador (1-2) 
Bolivia(4-8) ,Irag(3-4), 
Paraguay (2-4) ,Venezuela 
(1-3) ,Algeria(1-2) Chile 
(1-2) Ecuador (3) 
Uruguay (3-4) 
Bolivia (2-2) 
- Paraguay (6-9) ,Chile(3-4), 
Nigeria(4) ,Peru(2) ,Co- 
lombia (2) Mozambique (4), 
Trinidad (3) Uruguay (2) . 
Paraguay (4-7) ,Peru(2-4), 
Nigeria(2-4) ,Chile(2-3), 
Panamá (2) Colombia (2). 
Nigeria (2-8) 
Paraguay (3-8) Uruguay (2), 
Nigeria (2) 




SERVICE EXPORTS BY ASSEMBLING FIRMS BY TYPE OF WORK 
 
Suppliers Contracts Countries 
Dams and hydroelectric 
Countries with more than 
one supplier or contract 
  
Plants 7 8 4 Uruguay (4-5) 
Highways and 
railroads 4 4 4 E 
Manufacturing and Paraguay (3-6) ,Argentina processing plants 6 15 7 (2), Uruguay (1-2) 
Telecommnication 2 3 3 = 
Electric systems 7 24 1 Paraguay (4) Uruguay (2-4), 
Chile(2-2),Peru(1-3), 
Ecuador (1-3) Venezuela (2) 
Building 6 q 6 Uruguay (2) 
Others 1 2 1 Chile (1-2) 
Total 23 63 16 
TABLE 19 
OTHER ENGINEERING SERVICE EXPORTS BY TYPE OF WORK 
Suppliers Contracts Countries 









Countries with more than 
one supplier and/or 
contract 
Paraguay (2) ,Peru(2) ,Ar= 
gentina (1-2) Ecuador 
(2-3), Uruguay (2) 





BRAZIL: CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES ABROAD - 1970/1983 
 
Net assets range Value of contracts 
  
 
o, ae Ep aa Nunber OF 
o  Esctorê! CeMetO Guetraatos monmcãm Mel FAUBEDA (a) (b) (5) 
Largest 10 6 26 4.3 26 4,703.1 180.9 
From 11 to 20 3 10 Za 5 137.2 24 
Prom 21 to 30 6 15 2.5 13 661.3 50.9 
From 31 to 50 3 9 3.0 3 630.0 210.0 
From 51 to 100 2 7 4.5 7 ça 8.9 
From 101 to 110 2 BO ao 6 ego! 125 
No information 
available 5 5 1.0 4 132.1 33.0 
Total 2 74 2.9 57º 6,3/4.0 1.8 
(a) Number of contracts for which information is available 
(b) Values in US$ million. 




DISTRIBUTION OF CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES ABROAD 
By COUNTRIES - 1970/1983 
 
Value of contracts 
 
Contractors Contracts Number Of 
conitraçks (8) Total (b) | Average(b) 
Paraguay 8 15 
10 198.1 19.8 
Bolivia 4 8 
8 123.7 15.5 
* Uruguay a 6 
5 263.0 52.6 
Costa Rica 2 4 
3 20.0 6.7 
Colombia 1 4 
4 1231 30.8 
Venezuela 3 3 
2 1,267.0 633.5 
Chile 3 3 
3 39.6 13.2 
Peru 1 1 
ê 100.0 100.0 
Argentina 1 1 
- - a 
Latin America = 45 36 
2,134.5 59.3 
Mauritania t 4 
4 268.5 67.1 
Nigeria Ê 1 1 
588.0 588.0 
Tanzania 2 EU 
1 90.0 90.0 
Angola 2 2 2 
510.0 255.0 
Congo I i 1 
105.0 105.0 
Somalia d 1 
1 300.0 300.0 
Mozambique 1 1 
L 2.0 2.0 
Ivory Coast 1 z £ 
17.0 17.0 
Africa - iz 12 1,880.5 
156.7 
Algeria 2 8 
2 550.0 275.0 
Iraq 2 5 5 
1,681.0 336.2 
Libya ) 2 1 
48.0 - 
Saudi Arabia 1 1 1 
80.0 = 
Middle East = 16 9 
2,359.0 262.1 
Portugal 1 - 
= = 
Others a = 
= - 
Total 27 74 57 
6+374.0 111.8 
(a) Number of contracts for which information is avail
able. 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Madaçascar 1972/74 Exploration contract 
Iran 1972/77 Exploration rights covering an Braspetro (25%) + National 
offshore area in the Hormuz Iranian Oil Company (508), 
Strait. Mobil Oil (25%) 
Exploration activities Operator: Hormuz Petroleum 
suspended in 1976. 
Iraq 1972/79 Service contract with Irag Operator: Braspetro 
National Oil Company for 
E exploration in three areas. 
Exploration conclude in 
Majnoon and Nahr Umr 
in 1978. 
From 1980 Agreement for technical : 
cooperation between Eraspetro 
and INOC 
From 1982 Technical agreement conceming 
the development of the Nahr 
Um Oilficlds. 
Ecypt 1972/76 Exploration activities in the Braspetro, Egyptian General 
Westem Desert Petroleum Corp. 
Exploration suspended in 1976. Operator: Braspetro 
Colombia 1972/78 Joint venture: Petroleos Co Braspetro (50%) 
lorbo Brasileiros S/A.-Colbras 
1976/78 | Association contract with Eco- Colbras, Ecopetrol 
petrol 
Algeria 1572/78 Exploration activities in Braspetro, Sonatrach 
Chott Melrhir area Operator: Braspetro 
From 1978 Explortation of Ras Toumb 
field 
From 1980 Exploration activities in Braspetro, Sonatrach 
Block 422 (Zelfana) Operator: Braspetro 
Lybia 1974/79 Exploration activities in Braspetro, National Oil Corp. 
Sirte Basin and Murzuk Basin (NOC) 
à 
Operator: Braspetro 
From 1980 New contract for exploration Braspetro, NOC 
in the Murzuk Basin Operator: Braspetro 
From 1982 Drilling work in the Sirte 
Basin for Agip, under an 





Guatemala From 1978 
From 1980 
From 1982 
Angola From 1980 
From 1982 
Trinidad From 1980 
and Tobago 
People's Rep. From 1981 
of Congo 




Contract for petroleum 
exploration 
Exploration of Block AA in 
the Peten Basin 
Exploration of Block E 
Exploration of Block L 
Production sharing to 
Contract to Block 2 
Joint venture to act as 
operator in Block 4 
Assistance and Technical 
Cooperation Contract with 
Trinidad and Tobago Oil. 
Exploration activities in 
Marine - 1 Block 
Exploration activity in 
Howarin Gheida area 
Participation in the Geo- 
physical Frospection 
Agreement in seven offshore 
blocks 
Proposal to bidding opened 
by China National Offshore 
Oil Corp. 
Braspetro (24%), Texaco Pacific 
Philippines Inc. (713), 
Pacific Basins (5%) 
Operator: Texaco 
Braspetro (1/3), ispanica de 
Petroleo - Hispanoil (1/3), 
Elf Aquitaine (1/3) 
Operator: Hispanoil 
Braspetro (1/3), Hispancoil (1/3,, 
Elf (1/3) 
Operator: Fispanoil 
Braspetro (1/3), Hispanoil (1/3), 
Texaco (1/3) 
Operator: Texaco 
Braspetro (17,5%), Sonangol 
(25%), Texaco (40%), Total 
Cap (17,58) 
Operator: Texaco 
Braspetro, Sonangol, Petrofin 
Braspetro (12,5%), Hydro Censo, 
Cities Service, IEDC 
Operator: Cities Service 
Braspetro (80%), Hispanoil(204) 
Operator: Braspetro 
Braspetro, Pritish Petroleum, 
Broken Hill Prop., Petrocanada, 
Ranger Oil. 




TRE ACTIVITIES OF BRAZILIAN FIRMS ABROAD: AN EVALUATION 
The empirical evidence presented in Part I points out 
the movement of Brazilian firms towards the external market 
Guring the seventies. This trend began in the late seventies and 
was characterized mainly by a substantial increase in exports, 
particularly in manufactured goods exports. Such an increase can 
be associated with successive government incentives which were 
introduced from the mid-sixties and succeeded in increasing the 
competitiveness of Brazilian producers. 
The rise in manufaturing exports was followed, from the 
mid-seventies, by the increasing participation of Brazilian firms 
in new forms of undertakings abroad; in fact, both direct 
investment and service exports have expanded significantly during 
recent years. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence suggests that 
the importance and the significance of each of these forms of 
undertakings differ. In addition, a further distinction should be 
made as to the participation of firms of different sectors in such 
undertakings. E 
Despite the increase in Brazilian direct investment abroad 
from the mid-seventies, it is doubtful whether these investments 
can be characterized as a process. This is particularly true in 
relation to the manufacturing firms; in this case, investments are 
not very significant and the few investors are generally not among 
the largest and most important firms of their industries. In fact, 
only foreign investment by Brazilian financial institutions and by 
the State-owned cil firms can be focused on as a more definite and 
meaninçful trend. The expansion of Brazilian banks abroad has 
reflected both their effort to borrow on the international finance 
market during the period, and their support in increasing Brazilian 
exports to Latin America countries. As to Petrobras' investments 
and activities abroad, they were the result of a definite policy 
undertaking from 1974 in response to the oil crisis. 
cOla 
In contrast with direct investment abroad, the rise in 
service exports corresponds to a clear-cut and significant trend. 
Again a distinction should be made in relation to the importance 
of such exports for firms of different sectors. In fact, despite 
the shortcomings of the empirical evidence in this respect, it 
can be argued that technology exports by manufacturing firms are 
not a widespread phenomenon. On the other hand, as far as 
construction and design engineering firms are concerned, the rise 
in service exports does reflect a definite movement towards the 
external market which gathers a substantial proportion of the firms 
of the sector and includes most of the largest and most important 
ones. 
“ These introductory remarks suggest that the construction 
and engineering sector is the most relevant case for deeper analysis 
and evaluation. The following pages will focus on the nature and 
characteristics of its activities abroad. But the previous comments 
suggest also other points for further inquiry and discussion. With 
respect to manufacturing firms' investments abroad, it is argquable 
whether its small significance reflects a specific stage of 
Brazilian industrial growth (to be superseded in the future when 
the establishment of wholly-owned subsidiaries and/or the undertakingo 
of some new form of foreign investment would substitute for 
manufacturing exports), or whether there are some characteristics 
in the Brazilian industrial structure which hinder such an evolution. 
Another question, certainly related to the previous one, refers to 
the nature of the technology and service exports by Brazilian 
manufacturing and engineering firms. So far, they have basically 
been mere export operations and generally do not imply any further 
link between the Brazilian supplier and the foreign buyer. The 
possibility of these exports bringing about a new and more permanent 
relationship between supplier and buyer in the future is an opern 
question. We will return to these questions later.
52. 
1. Civil Engineering Service Exports 
Until the first quarter of this century, 
large construction 
works in Brazil were restricted to the const
ruction of railroads, 
ports and dams. Except for small dams for ir
rigation in the 
Northeast area, these works were demanded by 
foreign railway and 
public utility firms and were undertaken by
 these firms themselves 
or by foreign contractors. The participation
 of local entrepreneurs, 
when it occurred at all, was restricted
 to the subcontracting Of 
specific and technologically simples services.
 
Changes in Brazilian transportation and ene
rgy policies, 
which originated in the 1930's, brought abou
t a significant change 
in this picture and prompted the emergence 
of local construction 
companies. The first change consisted in th
e gradual substitution 
of road transport for railway. This new tre
nd was associated with 
an increasing role played by state governme
nts (notably from the 
mid-fourties) and by the federal government 
(from the mid-fifties) 
in the financing of road construction.
 In the same way, the 
shortage of electric energy, due to a rise 
in demand and to the 
decline in the investment by the foreign ele
ctricity firms, as well 
as the concentration of these firms' activiti
es in the large towns 
induced state governments (from the mid-fou
rties) and the federal 
government (fromthe late fifties and early
 sixties) to plan and 
promote the expansion of electricity supply
. Newly established 
State-owned firms invested heavily and promo
ted the construction 
of a substantial number of new and large dam
s and hydroelectric 
plants and the extension of the distribution syst
em. 
This government investment in transport and energy 
accounts for the emergence of the Brazilian co
nstruction and design 
engineering firms. It is worth noting that, a
t the initial stage, 
the works to be undertaken were relatively smal
l. This implied that 
they were unlikely to attract foreign contractors
 and that they 
were manageable by the emerging local constru
ction companies. These 
smaller works, however, enabled these local
 companies to grow 
and accumulate the resources and konw-how that wo
uld be required 
later by larger projects. Furthermore, as far a
s projects were 
53. 
contracted by government agencies, polit
ical links were frequently 
more important than cost and technical c
onsiderations in the choice 
of contractors. From this viewpoint,
 these initial years were 
decisive also in providing the emerging 
local entrepreneurs with 
the necessary political alliances at state 
and federal government 
levels. 
In this context, from the late fortie
s, small construction 
firms established in the major and most impo
rtant states benefited 
from the increasing government investment in
 infrastructural 
works,and from the shift from state to fed
eral government initiatives 
in order to expand their activities and reach
 a nationwide scale. 
The ability of local firms to stand up to the
 competition 
of potential foreign contractors was also en
hanced by the patterns 
of operation of the main sources of financing
 for the large projects 
— the Brazilian National Bank for Economic 
Development and inter- 
national and regional development banks. The 
support of such 
institutions implied the gradual supply of 
resources to the 
different and successive stages of a project 
(pre-feasibility 
studies; preliminary design; detailed design; p
rocurement of 
equipments; construction; supervision of cons
truction; and testing 
and starting-up Of new facilities). This patter
n induceá the 
specialization of Brazilian engineering firms
 in specific services 
so that, although they were unable to account
 for the project as a 
whole, they could undertake a particular sta
ge of the project. 
This definitively implied a clear-cut disti
nction between the 
construction and the design engineering firms 
in Brazil. 
It is noteworthy that, although the heading of 
this 
section refers to civil engineering services, 
the previous and 
following remarks apply equally to the mechan
ical and electric 
engineering services which are related to the
 production and 
distribution of electric energy. In fact, g
overnment investment in 
this area also brought about the mastery of 
the required 
technology by Brazilian engineering firms (i
n relation to equipment, 
however, this mastery refers to product enginee
ring rather than | 
production engineering; Brazilian production 
of heavy equipment has
.54. 
been basically provided by foreign subsidiaries or by local firms 
under licensing). In the same way, in more recent years, the heavy 
government investment in telecommunications has fostered the 
know-how of some Brazilian engineering firms. 
The point to emphasize here is that the above described 
evolution has krought about civil engineering activities in Brazil 
being almost entirely controlled by local companies. In fact, the 
shares of foreign subsidiaries in the book value and value added 
ir the construction sector were lower than 4% in 1975. This contrasts 
sharply with the manufacturing industry in which the shares of 
those subsidiaries were 36% and 38%, respectively. But the 
gevelopment of civil engineering works in Brazil not only implied 
the national control over this sector but also gave rise to large 
and powerful enterprises. There were 4 and 13 construction firms 
respectively among the 50 and 200 largest non-financial enterprises 
in Brazil in 1982 (according to their sales). Furthermore, 
construction and design firms constitute a well organized pressure 
group, with significant political influence on state and federal 
governments. 
1.1. Internal Determinants of Expansion Abroad 
In this context, it is not surprising that, after having 
moved from regional to national markets during the fifties, the 
construction and engineering firms would come to move towards 
external markets. From this point of view, one can inquire, in fact, 
why these firms did not join the manufacturing industry in the 
export effort in the early seventies. 
Several reasons account for the lag between the moves of 
the manufacturing sector and of the construction and engineering 
firms towards the external market. To start with, manufactured good 
exports were seen, at first, as a way out of the mid-sixties 
recession; as to the construction sector, recovery could dispense 
with such a stimulant and come about as a result of the increase 
in government expenditure. Later on, the growth of manufactured good 
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exports was promoted by economic policy as a means to improve the 
Brazilian balance of payments. As to service exports, they were not 
worth the attention of government policy as their possible impact 
on balance of payment was unlikely to be significant. 
Again, there were several factors which accounted for 
these less-than-bright prospects for service exports. Firstly, 
government policy counted on the possibility of inducing foreign 
subsidiaries! exports, which would provide the access to external 
markets — such subsidiaries did not exist in the construction and 
design engineering sector. Secondly, adequate financing support — 
a requisite for both manufacturing goods and service exports — 
could be more easily provided to the former, as the latter generally 
implied a longer amortization period. Furthermore, besides financing 
support, competitiveness of Brazilian good exports depended 
basically on competitive costs; government incentives could make up 
for possible inefficiency of local producers. Given the necessary 
government support, Brazilian exports of a large number of 
manufactured goods might then compete in both the developed and 
developing country markets. On the contrary, competitiveness of 
service exports depended more clearly on the technological ability 
of the would-be exporter. In addition, as the demand for engineering 
services was mostly a government demand, political factors were 
likely to have a major influence on the success of export efforts. 
In this context, the Third World countries — particularly, the 
Latin America countries — provided the potential market for 
Brazilian service exports. Nevertheless, even in such markets, the 
prospects for these exports in the early seventies looked dim due 
to the small size of these markets and to the potential competition 
of the large contractors and engineering firms from the developed 
countries. Moreover, Brazilian foreign policy during this period did 
not help to ingratiate Brazilian firms with the more militant 
Third World governments. 
Under such circumstances, the possibility of expanding 
service exports was not taken into account by Brazilian foreign 
trade policy. In fact, while incentives to manufactured good 
exports were introduced as early as the late sixties, those directed
56. 
to service exports were only brought in by the mid-seventies. And, 
in any case, the latter were never so significant as the former. 
Despite the lack of government support, the first attempts 
to move towards external markets had already begun in the early 
seventies,. These attempts were few, however, and few of them were 
successful. The only firm which had a more significant stake in 
the external market during this period (Rabelo) had been excluded 
from the domestic market for political reasons; contracting broad 
was required, therefore, for its very survival. Particular 
circumstances enabled this company to become rather successful in 
Algeria. The other attempts were timid and, in hindsight, can be 
seen at most as a mere rehearsal for future undertakings. 
What were then the new conditions that induced Brazilian 
construction and design engineering enterprises to look more 
decisively for the external market in the late seventies ? The first 
point to emphasize is certainly the very expansion of these 
enterprises as a result of the huge investment program undertaken 
by the Brazilian government. This expansion was likely to increase 
the growth potential of such enterprises. It is worth noting that 
the growth potential of firms in this sector is determined not only 
by their profit rate and internal accumulation but mainly by the 
improvement of their technical, managerial and organizational 
capability which allows the simultaneous undertaking of more 
numerous and more complex projects. Hence, Brazilian construction 
and engineering firms were likely to present a high growth potential 
during the 1970's, In fact, the average profit rate of this sector 
has shown a substantial increase in the early seventies, rising to 
16-19%, from about 8% in the late xixties. It is also significant 
that the largest firms in the sector had increased the 
diversification of their activities and entered new sectors during 
the decade. 
To be sure, government demand for large construction and 
engineering projects was still high. Despite a mild reduction in 
government constructron activities in 1975/1976, a new rise came 
about from 1977, This fact has prompted the argument that the 
“DT 
drive towards external markets cannot be seen as an effort of firms 
in this sector to realize their growth potential in face of 
insufficient domestic demand. This reasoning, however, misses the 
point: from the viewpoint of the need of a firm to move beyond its 
current market, what is relevant is not the size of the demand, or 
even its growth rate, but rather the comparison between this rate 
and the firm's growth potential, Therefore, given the hign growth 
potential of the construction and design engineering firms in the 
mid-seventies, “Brazilian market were not large enough for them" 
as an industry official has it. 
Furthermore, as some industry officials state now, perhaps 
with the benefit of hindsight, many construction and engineering 
firms had anticipated the inevitable end of the investment boom 
and consequent decline in the demand for large construction projects. 
This prospect induced some of them to look for new outlets for their 
productive capacity in anticipation of the decline to come. 
In any case, the drive towards external markets came to 
the full in the early eighties when construction demand effectively 
declined as a result of changes in economic policy and the conseguent 
decrease in government expenditure. 
It is worth mnoting that some officials in the sector seem 
aware that this decline is more than a mere cyclical down-turn, 
that the golden years are definitively over and that such a large 
amount of investment as undertaken during the last decade is 
unlikely to be repeated. From this point of view, for the large 
companies of the sector, if they were to keep on being large 
costruction or engineering firms, they should widen their activities 
in the external market and become multinational enterprises. 
The effective move of construction and engineering firms 
towards the external market brought out government action in support 
of service exports. The political influence of such firms was 
sufficient to prompt the new government attitude. Furthermore, the 
increasingly serious difficulties faced by the Brazilian payment 
balance from the mid-seventies — mainly as a result of the rise
15:86 
in oil prices — called for a renewed export effort; in this context, 
export opportunities which could be overlooked in the previous 
years had now to be pursued. In addition, changes in the international 
scene, which will be referred to later, may have persuaded government 
authorities that the prospects for service exports were not so 
gloomy as some years before. Moreover, government authorities and 
entrepreneurs realized that capital good exports could greatly 
benefit from the previous export of design engineering. Finally, 
Brazilian foreign policy was undergoing a major turn during this 
period, which implied a renewed attention to the developing 
countries and aimed at stregthening the links with these countries 
and at assuming a leading position in the Third World. The new 
foreign policy focused mainly on Latin America and Africa, on the 
account of geographical, ethnical and cultural reasons, and the 
Arab oil producer countries, out of economic considerations. The 
implication of the new policy on service export is twofold. On the 
one hand, it favoured Brazilian firm's dealings with developing 
country governments. On the other hand, service exports might be 
sought out and stimulated by Brazilian government as a means to 
improve diplomatic relations and Brasilizn presence in specific 
countries. 
Government promotion of technology and service exports 
had as a background the government policy to induce the mastery of 
imported technology and foster the national technological capability. 
This policy, which dates from the late sixties, was based mainly on 
the financing of research, development and design activities by 
research institutes, consulting and design engineering firms and 
manufacturing enterprises by a special finance agency - FINEP. 
Nevertheless, as far as exports were concerned, government support 
aimed basically at ensuring competitiveness of Brazilian potential 
exporters. 
with such an aim, new legislation introduced income tax 
exemption on profits from technology exports and on insurance 
commissions related to services rendered abroad, as well tax 
exemption on capital goods exports on temporary bases. In addition, 
Banco do Brasil granted bidding, performance and refundment bonds 
for covering the risks related to bidding and failure in fulfilling 
EO 
contractual obligations. The emphasis of Brazilian policy, however, 
aimed at providing financing conditions which were competitive 
in the international market . Therefore, FINEP was brought in to 
finance market prospecting and proposals for prospective customers. 
Moreover, the Foreigh Trade Division (CACEX) of Banco do Brasil 
financed also, in favourable conditions, up to 85% of the costs of 
studies, projects and services undertaken abroad, as well as up to 
80% of the purchase of domestic equipment to be used in such 
services. In addition, the Central Bank subsidized Brazilian private 
banks for borrowing in the international market in order to finance 
service contracts abroad under favourable conditions; the subsidy 
corresponded then to the difference between the borrowing costs 
and the costs which were charged to the service exporter firms. 
This interest rate equalization scheme was quite effective so far 
as good liquidity conditions prevailed in the international finance 
market. 
Table 25 shows that CACEX financing support for service 
exports has amounted to US$946 million until December 1983, This 
financing fluctuated consideably during the period: US$186.5 million 
in 1976/77, US$380.7 million in 1978/79, US$87 million in 1980/81 
and US$291.3 million in 1982/1983. Most of CACEX support refers to 
civil engineering works and projects. Manufacturing and processing 
plants accounted for only 20% of total financing, two-third of which 
was directed to a single undertaking — a steel plant in Paraguay. 
The US$754 million worth of financing to civil engineering 
projects was mainly directed to construction firms which accounted 
for 15 financed contracts and for 91% of the total financing. 
Furthermore, this financing was highly concentrated both in a few 
contracts and in a few countries — five contracts and five 
countries (Iraq, Peru, Tanzania, Congo and Uruguay), accounted, 
respectively, for 67% and 80% of total financing. In addition, 90% 
of this total amount was related to dams, hydroelectric plants, 
highways, and railroads projects and works. In relation to the 
construction firms, the US$684 million worth of financing corresponded 
to 11% of the total value of 57 contracts for which information on 
value is available. For the three more important contractors (Mendes
60. 
Jr., Andrade Gutierrez and Odebrecht), this percentage was within 
the range 11% - 17%. On the other hand, these three firms accounted 
for 78% of the total financing to construction firms (the percentage 
relative to Mendes Jr. is 58%). 
Government support to service exports was also provided 
through Interbras — a subsidiary of Petrobras, which was 
incorporated as a trading-company in order to benefit from Petrobras's 
position as the largest world oil buyer. Its activities, however, 
have not been restricted tooil exporter countries only, and Interbras 
is now a trading-company in its own right, which exported US$2.6 
billion in 1982. As far as service exports are concerned, Interbras 
has participated in 30 successful deals which has given rise to 
contracts of the total value of US$1.65 billion (among them, the 
US$1.2 billion contract for a railroad in Irag). Table 26 shows the 
distribution of such contracts according to the nature of the 
exported services and the Brazilian exporters. Two-thirds of these 
contracts refer to civil engineering projects. Nine deals are 
related to construction firms. It is noteworthy, however, that — if 
we do not take into account the US$1.2 billion contract, and one for 
which no information on its value is available — the remaining 
seven construction contracts amount to US$128 million, that is, 
less than 2.5% of the total value of 57 contracts for which 
information is available. 
1.2. Brazilian firms abroad: why they have succeeded and how 
they operate 
The rapid growth of the developing country demand for 
construction works and engineering services during the seventies has 
certainly been the main precondition for the expansion of Brazilian 
firms abroad. Several factors account for this fast rise: the 
continual increase in financing by international and regional 
development banks and funds; the favourable liquidity conditions in 
the international finance market; and the investment programs of 
oil exporter countries. In short, available funding translated the 
permanent infrastructural need of developing countries for 
construction and enginering services, into an actual growth in demand. 
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This expansion of the international market was followed 
by changes in the supply conditions which allowed the entry of new 
competitors. To start with, the very high market growth rate made 
it difficult for the traditional suppliers to keep pace with 
demand. Furthermore, there are hints that these suppliers were 
loosing competitiveness in face of potential newcomers, due to 
their higher labour costs and, in the case, of U.S. firms, as a 
result of U.S. legislation and the lack of government-sponsered 
financing in comparison with other countries. In addition, it has 
already been suggested that the long-run strategy of U.S. and 
European leading firms includes the retreat from some civil 
engineering design and construction activities in order to concentrate 
on more complex specialities such as large-scale process, power and 
manufacturing process, as well as on construction management. From 
this point of view, a rough international division of labour 
appeared be evolving in the construction and design engineering 
industry, which opened the lower end of the spectrum of technological 
complexity to the developing country firms. One may argue, however, 
that this possible retreat of the leading firms of developed 
countries may also open this market segment up to intermediate firms 
of such countries. 
dos mar wonder also if this possible strategy of the 
developed country companies is not the very result of the emergence 
of a growing number of international consulting, design and 
construction engineering firms based in developing countries during 
the last decades. In fact, if the barriers to entry in this industry 
are being overcome by the latter, the outlook is an increase in 
competition and a decline in profit margins. These prospects might 
induce traditional suppliers to retreat to segments of the market 
which they could keep under more tight control. The question 
should be then whether the previous retreat of developed country 
firms made possible the emergence of new competitors from developing 
countries, of whether the entry of the latter prompted the retreat 
of the former. 
It is worth, hence, focusing on the nature of the barriers 
toentry in this sector and, then, on the specific characteristics 
of the Brazilian firms which have allowed them to overcome these 
barriers and to encroach on external markets. Despite being part
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of ageneral movement of construction and engineering firms from 
developing countries towards the international market, the success 
of Brazilian firms abroad presents reasons of its own. 
From Bain's traditional sources of barriers to entry, 
capital requiremente can be discarded as not very important. This 
is true not only for the design engineering firms but also for 
construction firms since, although many contractors own their own 
equipment, such equipment is usually available for lease. Therefore, 
entry will basically depend on the possibility of a newcomer | 
presenting competitive costs and of overcoming a possible customers" 
preference for the traditional suppliers. Competitive costs depend 
basically on the technical efficiency of the newcomer but also on 
“its labour costs and on the financing conditions it can offer. As 
to customers' preference, it is likely to reflect technical 
reputation and previous experience, as well as political links at 
firm and government levels. 
Technical knowledge of Brazilian construction and design 
engineering firms has been accumulated during the last four 
decades through learning-by-doing and the mastery of some specific 
transferable technologies. This process was favoured by the large 
investment programs undertaken by the Brazilian government during 
this period (in particular, during the seventies) and by the 
oligipolistic structure of this industry which implied a high degree 
of concentration of government demand on few construction and design 
engineering firms. Furthermore, the learning-by-doing process has 
acquainted these firms with the peculiarities and shortcomings of a 
developing country economy. As a result of this investment boom, 
the Brazilian large construction companies, for example, have 
probably built more highways and large dams and hydroelectric plants 
than any developed country firm during the last ten years. In 
addition, it is unlikely that any of such developed country firms 
have the same experience as the Brazilian ones in undertaking large 
works under very tough environmental conditions. 
In short, Brazilian firms combine the mastery of the most 
modern civil engineering technology and the capability to take into 
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account the specific conditions of developing countries. As already 
mentioned, this is also true in relation to the mechanical and 
electric engineering konw-how associated with the production and 
distribution of electric energy, as well as to the intermediate 
telecommunication technology. Therefore, in the case of construction 
and other engineering services, even if Brazilian firms only match 
the technical ability of the U.S. and European enterprises, they 
have a possible advantage from an organizational and managerial 
viewpoint, due to their skill at bringing together and efficiently 
managing, under the conditions prevailing in developing countries, 
the large variety of inputs required by large construction works 
and due to their skill at rapidly training large number of unskilled 
people. 
In relation to cost competitiveness, labour costs favour 
Brazilian as well as other developing country firms. This is mostly 
true for the consulting and design services, in which labour costs 
pratically determine the contract value, and also for the expendirture 
on technicians and workers from the home country in the construction 
works (although, in this latter case, Brazilian firms' costs might 
not be so low as those of other developing country companies). 
Moreover, Brazilian firms may have also an advantage over the 
developed country firms even in relation to the costs associated 
with local and expatriate workers, due to their previous experience 
in rapidly training and dealing with unskilled people. 
The practice of Brazilian firms concerning their working 
force abroad depends on the particular country conditions. As a 
general rule, local workers predominate in the Latin American 
undertakings and Brazilian and expatriate workers, in the Africa 
and Middle East ones. Brazilian contractors have been quite 
successful in putting together and co-ordinating workers of different 
origin and cultural background. For example, the largest Prazilian 
undertaking abroad — the construction of railroad in Iraq - brought 
together at its peak four thousand Brazilian and ten thousand | 
expatriate workers. It is true that labour problems account, to a | 
large extent, for most of the difficulties faced in the least 




of a US$1.2 billion dam in venez
uela by a consortium of two firm
s, 
the largest together with the qe"
 largest Brazilian construction
 
firms and local companies. Nevert
heless, this is certainly an 
exception. In any case, the failu
re of the consortium in carrying 
out the work, which implied part 
of the contract being transferred 
to developed country contractors a
nd heavy loss for the Brazilian 
associates, had as a consequence 
the resigning of the Brazilian 
largest construction firm from fu
rther undertakings abroad. 
As to financing, Brazilian firms 
have basically faced two 
different kinds of dealings. The f
irst one refers to projects 
£inanced by international and regio
nal development banks and funds, 
and also by host governments, in 
which financing precedes the bidd
ing 
for the project. In such cases, 
turn key projects are uncommon (
and 
unheard-of as far as some ag
encies, such as the World Ba
nk, are 
concerned), as the projects are us
ually broken up in their successiv
e 
stages and independent designers 
and supervisors are generally 
required. In this context, financi
ng is obviously not a competitive 
factor. A second possibility corre
sponds to projects in which a 
would-be contractor must provide 
its own financing which becomes, 
hence, a factor to be taken into ac
count by the customer. This 
requirement may appear both in a d
irect deal between a firm and a 
potential customer and as a bi
dding condition. On the other 
hand, 
this requirement may apply both to 
a turn key project (in which a 
bid consists of a package co-ordina
ted by a would-be main contractor, 
involving the design, execution, a
nd equipment supply and financing) 
and to the simple undertaking of spe
cific stages of a complex project. 
This second scheme predominated dur
ing the seventies as 
the abundant supply of funds in the 
international finance market 
allowed potential customers to avoid
 the delay generally involved 
in the dealings with development bank
s, as well as their requirements. 
However, changes occurred in th
e international finance market 
during the eighties and, in particular
, the increasing foreign debt 
of developing countries brought this 
practice to a halt. Furthermore, 
the simultaneous decline in the reven
ue of the oil exporting 
countries implied a decrease in gov
ernment sponsored projects even 
in the richer of the Third World cou
ntries. In this context, 
s6D. 
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developing countries are bound 
to rely more heavily on developm
ent 
banks and aid agencies, which tend
 to become the main financing 
source for contracts in these countri
es. 
Brazilian firms have successfully 
faced both financing 
schemes. From their point of view, t
he World Bank-type procedure 
dispenses with the need for providi
ng financing and hence circumvents 
one of their possible competitive di
sadvantage. Furthermore, it is 
worth recalling that the emergence of
 engineering firms in Brazil 
was itself largely conditioned by si
milar practices and, in 
particular, by the breaking up of la
rge projects according to their 
different stages and into several b
iddings. As already mentioned, 
this circumstance has induced the 
specialization of engineering 
firms in specific services and impli
ed a clear-cut distinction 
between the construction and the des
ign engineering firms in Brazil. 
Therefore, insofar as it excludes tur
n key projects, this kind of 
procedure may facilitate the partici
pation of Brazilian firms in 
internacional biddings and, in partic
ular, benefits design and 
highly specialized engineering firms 
which may enter an undertaking 
on their own. 
It is worth emphasizing, however, that 
the relative 
specialization of Brazilian firms do
es not prevent them from 
undertaking turn key projects. To me
ntion one example, the 
construction of the hydroelectric pla
nt of Palmar, in Uruguay, was 
a US$248 million turn key contract, wh
ich had as main contractors, 
a construction and a design engineeri
ng firm (Mendes Junior and 
Engevix), involving at least a furthe
r eight design and specialized 
engineering firms, and was granted b
y CACEX financing support which 
amounted to 30% of the contract valu
e. 
The second kind of dealings whic
h were mentioned above, 
although implying the burden of the 
financing arrangements, makes 
room for creative solutions and, in 
particular, allow the Brazilian 
firms to take advantage of specific 
features of the relations 
between Brazil and other developing c
ountries. A recent example of 
such a deal is provided by a dam and 
hydroelectric plant to be built 
in Angola by Oderbrecht. This project




supplied by Soviet Union, corresponds in fact to a barter as the 
construction costs incurred by Odebrecht will be paid by the 
supply of oil from Angola to Petrobras. 
This brings forward the question of the customer preference 
for established suppliers, the last of the sources of barriers to 
entry to be examined. It is obvious that, in general, Brazilian 
technical reputation cannot be compared with that of the U.S. and 
European countries. Nevertheless, as far as civil engineering and 
the associated mechanical and electric engineering are concerned, 
Brazilian firms have accumulated a large and successful experience 
in domestic works which attests to their technical capability. More 
than that, in relation to the specific demand of the developing 
countries, Brazilian firms may even claim to be better qualified 
than their developed country competitors as they probably surpass 
most of them in the number of similar works undertaken in recent 
years and as they certainly are more acquainted with the peculiarities 
and difficulties of operating under developing country conditions. 
In any case, even if this pretension were not justified, it is 
certainly plausible. 
On the other hand, insofar as civil engineering contracts 
result basically from government demand, political considerations 
play an important role in producing the customer preference. From 
this viewpoint, as already mentioned, the major shift in Brazilian 
foreign policy in the mid-seventies, which implied a firm alliance 
with the Third World countries in the international forum and the 
definite support to the Arab cause in the Middle East, certainly 
helped to ingratiate Brazilian firms with their potential clients. 
Furthermore, opportunities resulting from common economic interests 
and, in the case of the oil exporter countries, the possibility of 
deals which are not far from an explicit barter are factors to be 
taken into account by the developing country governments and which 
may even overshadow technical and cost considerations. In this 
context, it is exactly inthose undertakings sponsored by the host 
country governments that the exertion of Brazilian government 
influence to promote Brazilian firms' business abroad is more likely 
to be successful. In fact, the small political weight of the 
“Bds 
Brazilian government in the international finance agencies does 
not enable it to intervene in those undertaking in which such 
agencies play the major role. 
The experience of Brazilian engineering firms in Nigeria 
provides a good example, though perhaps an extreme one, of the 
importance of political factors and government-to-government 
relations for the expansion of Brazilian firms abroad. As a result 
of a political decision to reduce its dependence on European 
suppliers, the Nigerian Ministry of Communication approached its 
Brazilian counterpart in the mid-seventies. The large expansion of 
Brazilian telecommunication network and services from the mid-xisties 
as well as the role played by State-owned teleccommunication 
enterprises and by local design engineering firms in such expansion 
were taken as attesting to Brazil's capability in this area. From 
the Brazilian viewpoint, Nigeria was a welcome customer not only 
by political reasons but mainly by the bilateral trade possibilities. 
Therefore, the Brazilian Ministries of Communication and of Foreign 
Affairs strongly supported the two largest design engineering firms 
(Hidroservice and Promon), which have been involved in the expansion 
of Brazilian telecommunication network, in their effort to answer 
Nigeria's demand. To be sure, the initial services provided by 
these firms did not imply the effective supply of technology, as 
they referred basically to the supervision of projects which had 
been previously designed by European companies. Nevertheless, these 
initial contracts were followed by new ones, some of them involving 
more complex technology, and gave rise to a permanent presence of 
such firms in Nigeria. Such a presence has implied the diversification 
Of the two firm's activities in the country and brought about their 
entry into new areas (mainly, irrigation projects). Moreover, such 
a presence has also strenghthened their links with local firms and 
given rise to the establishment of a subsidiary in Nigeria, in a 
joint venture with local engineers. 
At this point, it is worth focusing on the relationships 
of the Brazilian service exporter firms not only to local companies 
from the recipient countries but also with other Brazilian 
engineering firms, and with similar service exporter enterprises 






Tables 27 and 28, which sum up information collected at 
the inventory on service exports presented in Part I, make explicit 
that the movement of engineering firms towards the external market 
frequently joins several Brazilian firms together into a single 
undertaking. In fact, a significant percentage of the design and 
other engineering services which were identified in that inventory 
is associated with works undertaken by construction firms (48 out of 
the total of 261 contracts). This percentagen is particularly high 
in the case of services related to dams and hydroelectric plants 
(31 out of 44 contracts) and highways and railroads (13 out of 40). 
Mendes Junior's undertakings account for most of such contracts 
(22); thirteen of them are related to a hydroelectric plant tur-key 
project in Uruguay and seven to a railrcad in Irag. However, the 
simultaneous presence of several Brazilian firms in a single 
undertaking is not restricted to construction works carried out by 
Brazilian contractors. At least in six cases, shown in Table 28, 
all the Brazilian participants in the undertaking are consulting, 
design or other specialized engineering firms. Among these six cases, 
the most interesting one is a turn key project of a steel plant in 
Paraguay, which involves nine Brazilian firms and twelve contracts. 
This consists in a joint venture between a local State-owned holding 
company (with 60% of capital stock), the Brazilian engineering firm 
Tenenge (2%) and the Brazilian steel firm Coferraz (38%). The 
latter two partners are responsible for the turn key project, 
having recourse to Brazilian capital good producers and to the 
services of Brazilian design and assembling firms. 
It should be pointed out, however, that the above results 
do not necessarily imply any kind of consortium or subcontracting 
between the different Brazilian firms involved in a same undertaking 
abroad. In fact, this simultaneous presence frequently reflects 
independent deals between the foreign customer and the different 
Brazilian companies; this is particularly true in thoses projects 
which are financed by international and regional development banks, 
as such agencies promote separate biddings for different services 
or stages Of the work. 
On the other hand, it is worth noting that subcontracting 
is more frequent than consortium among Brazilian firms and that, 
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even when the latter ocrurs, the technical specialization of the 
firms involved are generally complementary rather than similar. 
For example, a consortium between construction firms or between the 
large and diversified engineering firms is not usual; nevertheless, 
such firms can associate themselves with specialized engineering 
firms, either as a consortium or on a subcontracting basis. 
Brazilian construction firms, in particular, see themselves 
as competitors in the international merket. Not only do they seldom 
associate themselves in undertakings abroad but also they often ccme 
across as competitors in international bidding. Nevertheless, there 
are hints of some kind of implicit agreements between the larger 
construction firms which imply their refraining from major moves 
into each others main activity areas. In any case, this kind of 
agreement is restricted to direct dealings with potential customers 
and does not apply to open international biddings. 
Although Brazilian engineering firms are not particularly 
enthusiastic about associating with each other, they generally had 
a definite policy of searching for association with other 
international engineering companies, both as subcontractors or in a 
consortium scheme. (A recent example of such an association is 
provided by a US$2.4 billion contract for the construction of a 
railroad from Bagdad to Basrah in Iraq by Mendes Junior and a South 
Korean construction firm; the value of this contract, which is 
currently at its final negotiation stage, is twice the size of the 
largest Brazilian contract abroad so far). 
The reasons for such different policies towards compatriot 
and foreign associates are evident. A Brazilian associate usually 
adds little to the chance of success of a Brazilian firm in the 
international market. On the contrary, association with large 
developed, or even developing, country firms can enhance their 
competitive position. From this point of view, a consortium with a 
dev doped country company is particularly welcomed as these companies 
are likely to be seen as more technically qualified than the 
Brazilian one by developing country customers. In addition, such 
associations have also been looked to as a way Of widening the 






where the Brazilian firm has been active, by fostering its links 
with other international companies, may open these companies! 
home markets (or other countries in which they have traditionally 
operated) up to the Brazilian firm. 
Finally, it is worth emphasizing the Brazilian engineering 
firms' willingness to associate themselves with local companies. It 
is true that the existence of such associates is frequently a 
requirement of the recipient country government. Tt is also true, 
that construction firms, when subcontracting with local companies, 
are frequently only conforming to their pattern of operation in 
their home country. Nevertheless, Brazilian firms have entered into 
such association to a larger extent than required and some of them 
(even design engineering firms) have as definite policy not to 
undertake any project abroad without such a partnership. There are 
obvious reasons for searching for a local associate. Their existence 
makes easier for a foreign contractor to operate in the country not 
only by their acquaintance with the institutional, commercial and 
financial environment but also by the political implications of 
such an association. 
So far, association with local companies has been restricted 
to subcontracting or consortium and referred to specific projects. 
The foreign subsidiaries of Brazilian engineering firms — generally 
established in tax havens and in countries to which they are 
exporting their services — are basically wholly-controlled 
subsidiaries. The only known exception is Promon's subsidiary in 
Nigeria in which the Nigerian staff owns 60% of the capital; but 
the Brazilian Promon itself is controlled by its technical staff. 
However, although association with locals has been 
restricted to specific projects so far, some industry officials 
envisage that the continuation of their firms' activities in some 
developing countries will depend on their willingness to establish 
more permanent links with local capital. Their evaluation — which 
is, to a large extent, based on Brazilian experience — has it that, 
sooner or later, and though to different extent, some developing 
country governments will reserve the local market to firms established 
eat 
in the country and possibly require that l
ocal capital have a share 
in such firms. Therefore, at least in 
those firms which have 
realized that if they are to keep on being la
rge construction and 
engineering firms, they should become multinat
ional enterprises, 
industry officials clearly contemplate the possi
bility of joint 
ventures with local capital in the more promisi
ng developing country 
markets. 
2 - Industrial Technology Exports and Manufacturing Fi
rms" 
Investment Abroad 
The inventory presented in Part 1 has showed tha
t the drive 
of Brazilian manufacturing firms towards the exte
rnal market implied 
a substantial increase in manufactured goods expor
ts from the late 
sixties but has not yet given rise to a similar i
ncrease in other 
forms of undertakings abroad. Furthermore,
 there are hints that 
most of these other undertakings are related and 
complementary to the 
manufacturing export activities of Brazilian firms
 rather than 
a substitute for them. 
In fact, from the 58 industrial technology suppliers w
hich 
were identified by Sercovich's (1983) inventory, 27 
are capital 
good producers. Now, technology export deals by such pr
oducers are 
frequently associated with and required by manufacturing ex
ports 
and do not necessarily imply a new step towards the e
xternal market. 
Inthis respect, it is noteworthy that 63 out of 69 op
erations 
undertaken by capital goods producers correspond to t
echnical 
assistance contracts and turn key operations; only si
x licencing 
agreements seem to imply a more permanent link with 
foreign recipients. 
In the same way, most of the manufacturing firms' 
direct investment 
seem to be associated with their export efforts. More 
often than 
not, these undertakings correspond to sale outlets or 
are designed 
to provide technical assistance to local customers. 
This paper is mainly concerned, however, about thos
e 
undertakings which imply a step further towards t
he external market,
etês 
than merely manufacturing exports and their substitutes — that is, 
licencing, permanent technical assistance agreements and equity 
participation in wholly-owned manufacturing subsidiaries and in 
joint ventures. In addition, we will focus also on turn key 
operations, as distinct from mere capital goods exports, and, in 
particular, on the possibility of their bringing about permanent 
links between supplier and buyer. 
Insofar as empirical evidence shows a small significance 
of such undertakings, the relevant question is whether this 
corresponds to a specific stage of Brazilian industrial growth, to 
be superseded in the future, or whether there are some characteristics 
in the Brazilian industrial structure which hinders the present 
export drive being followed by other forms of undertakings abroad. 
In this respect, two points must be emphasized. The first 
refers to the importance of multinational enterprises in the 
Brazilian manufacturing sector; the second, to the sources of 
technology for the local manufacturing firms. 
Table 29 presents the share of foreign firms in the book 
value of manufacturing industries in the mid-seventies. It shows that 
such firms accounted for 36% of total book value of manufacturing 
sector. This share is higher than 50% in the electrical and 
communication equipment, transport equipment, rubber, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, perfumary and soap and tobacco industries. In 
addition, the share of foreign firms in the nonmetallic minerals, 
metallurgy, machinery and paper and pulp industries are within the 
range 25%-50%, More important, however, is the fact that foreign 
subsidiaries in the different manufacturing industries are 
concentrated in the most dynamic segments of the market, in which 
they usually predominate. 
Multinational firms account also for a significant share 
of Brazilian manufactured goods exports: 37% of such exports in 
1978 (Table 29), This percentage is particularly high in some sectors 
such as rubber (81%), electrical and communication equipment (772), 
transport equipment (68%), pharmaceuticals (66%) and machinery (56%). 
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Furthermore, 105 out of the 300 largest manufactured goods exporters 
in 1980 were foreign subsidiaries, which accounted for 33% of such 
exports (the share of the 25 largest ones was 24%). 
On the other hand, it is worth emphasising the reliance of 
the local manufacturing firms on imported technology. At the early 
stages of the Brazilian industrialization process, the necessary 
technology was widely known, basically incorporated in the required 
capital goods and hence supplied by their foreign producers. Later, 
the more complex technological requirements were basically met by 
licencing and technical agreements with foreign producers. In fact, 
the very import-substitution nature of Brazilian industrialization 
favoured the recourse to imported know-how (rather than efforts by 
local firms to develop the required technology), as it induced the 
assimilation of the technological characteristics of the previously 
exporting industries of the developed countries and required the 
prompt reaction of would-be producers to the new investment 
opportunities. 
This development not only served to weaken the technological 
capability of the local manufacturing firms but also hindered the 
mastery of industrial technologies by Brazilian consulting and 
design engineering firms. To be sure, government policies were 
introduced during the seventies in order to increase the participation 
of localengineering firms with the investment projects which were 
being undertaken during this period. However, insofar as the basic 
technology for such undertakings were provided by foreign suppliers, 
the participation of the Brazilian consulting and design engineering 
firms in such projects was mainly restricted to detail engineering. 
Owing to these characteristics of the Brazilian industrial 
structure, it is unlikely that the recent rise in manufactured goods 
exports will be followed by a similar increase in industrial 
technology exports or direct investment by manufacturing firms. 
To start with, the decisive engagement of Brazilian 
subsidiaries of multinational firms in manufacturing exports dces
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not necessarily indicate further moves of these subsidiaries towards 
the external market. In fact, multinational firms may assign 
particular national markets to any of its subsidiaries in order to 
utilize existing productive capacity, benefit from lower production 
costs or conform to requirements of local governments. Technology 
exports, however, are a different case. Multinational firms 
concentrate their R and D activities in developed countries, and 
eventual innovations by subsidiaries are likely to be appropriated 
by the home company and transmitted abroad through the firms' 
international network. In this context, particular experiences of 
technology exports by multinational firms' affiliates may be seen 
as incidental. A possible exception is provided by subsidiaries of 
capital good producers, as disembodied technology exports are 
frequently associated with and required by the capital goods exports 
themselves. But such technology exports do not substitute for goods 
exports. 
In the same way, the undertaking of foreign investment by 
subsidiaries of multinational firms is usually, restricted to tax 
haven affiliates. To be sure,due to its knowledge of conducting 
business in a developing country environment, a specific affiliate 
may come to provide administrative assistance to other subsidiaries 
or even be charged with the supervision of their activities; but 
this is merely a matter of administrative policy of the multinational 
enterprises and is unlikely to imply contractual links or give rise 
to payments between subsidiaries. 
The previous remarks suggest that technology exports and 
direct investment abroad are possibilities which are basically 
restricted to local firms. In this context, the large share of 
multinational firms in the Braziliam manufacturing sector is itself 
a factor which hinders such forms of expansion abroad. Nevertheless, 
one can argue that such a possibility still exists as far as the 
local firms are concerned. 
However, this is only a possibility, unlikely to turn into 
effective undertakings, in those industries in which foreign 
subsidiaries predominate and local firms merely fill the interstices 
left open by the multinational enterprises. The weak and subordinate 
position of these local firms in their domestic market certainly 
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does not favour their venturing abroad. 
We must focus, then, on the large local firms. It is 
worth noting the predominance of some particular forms of market 
structure among those industries in which such large local firms 
are present, and have a strong position and significant market 
share. In fact, these are usually competitive or homogeneous 
oligopolistic industries. In contrast, the market control by 
multinational enterprises occurs mainly in those industries in which 
product differentiation competition plays a major role. 
This peculiarity is not surprisina.For one thing, insofar 
as local firms are usually unable to match the product differentiation 
capability of the multinational enterprises, their ability to 
stand up to competition from foreign affiliates is usually restricted 
to homogeneous product industries. More important, however, is the 
fact of local firms being less exposed to competition from 
multinational enterprises in these latter industries, in which the 
phenomenon of multinationalization is less significant. In this 
respect, economic literature has emphasised product differentiation 
as one necessary characteristic of industries in which substantial 
direct investment occurs. 
This proposition of the literature on multinational 
enterprises has further implication from the point of view of the 
expansion of Brazilian manufacturing firms abroad. The historical 
evolution of the Brazilian economy brought about the concentrarion 
of the large local firms in those sectors in which they diá not 
have to match, or could stand up to the competition of multinational 
firms. This means, however, that Brazilian manufacturing firms are 
mainly concentrated in those industries which have been traditionally 
less prone, even in developed economies, to substitute capital 
exports for manufacturing goods exports and to undertake direct 
investment abroad. This characteristic suggests that the present 
export drive of the Brazilian manufacturing sector does not 
necessarily point to further steps towards the external market, 
On the other hand, the passive reliance of the local 
manufacturing firms on imported technology does not favour their
«76 
becoming industrial technology exporters. Furthermore, this rel
iance 
on impor ted technology has implied that Brazilian consulting and 
design engineering firms were bound to play a subsidiary role in the
 
manufacturing investment undertakings, as their participation was 
mainly restricted to providing detail engineering for imported 
projects. Now, this specialization in detail engineering even 
hinders their possibility of exporting in this very area. In fact, 
even those developing countries which are eager to resort to civil 
engineering services from Brazilian companies are likely to 
demand 
the detail engineering for their investment projects from firms 
associated with the process engineering suppliers, rather than from 
Brazilian firms. As a result , the prospects for industrial 
technology exports by Brazilian consulting and design engineering 
firms are certainly not so hopeful as for their civil engineering 
exports. 
These comments on the manufacturing and engineering firms 
should not be taken, however, as a sweeping generalisation. In fact, 
many local firms have assimilated very complex technology and have 
been able to adapt imported technology to suit Brazilian conditions; 
local capital has also been able to hold its ground in several 
differentiated markets; large local firms from homogeneous product 
industries have undertaken direct investment abroad; and Brazilian 
manufacturing and engineering firms do undertake industrial 
technology exports. 
The point to stress, however, is that the inventory of 
direct investment by manufacturing firms and of industrial technology 
exports is indeed a "collection of isolated cases" not only for not 
comprehending significant segments of Brazilian manufacturing 
industries overall, but also for only involving local firms in a few 
undertakings abroad, rather than giving rise to genuine mu
lti- 
nationalization of its activities. In fact, of the 63 lar
gest 
investors abroad, 52 firms have investment in a single country and
 
eight firms, in two countries. In the same way, fourteen out of 
twenty engineering firms which have sold industrial technology 
abroad have only one contract. On the other hand, even in those 
sectors which account for the largest shares of direct investment 
or industrial technology exports, the numbers of such investors and 
technology suppliers are not significant. 
These "isolated cases", besides reflecting the good 
fortune of particular firms, are likely to occur in sectors in which 
Brazilian firms have acquired some comparative adavntages — probably 
related to simple technology products or to technologies which have 
been adapted to peculiar conditions of developing countries or to 
particular raw materials. Nevertheless, it is difficult to identify 
regular patterns or definite trends which can be derived from such 
a collection of isolated cases. 
As a result the remainder of this section will focus on 
some of these isolated cases. They were chosen as examples (possibly, 
the most interesting examples) of the different kinds of undertakings 
abroad by Brazilian firms. It must be emphasized, however, that 
these examples should not be taken as representative of any general 
pattern or trend. 
Direct investment as a complement to manufactured goods exports: 
the Vilares case 
Vilares! investments abroad, which amount to US$1.1 million, 
present larger geographical diversification than any other Prazilian 
investor's covering six Latin American countries (Mexico, Colombia, 
Chile,Uruguay, Paraguay and Argentina). 
Vilares in one of the largest and most diversified capital 
goods producers. Its sales amounted to US$500 million in 1983 and 
includes:lifts and escalators; electric motors and generators; steel 
products, such as rolled and forged bars, rolling mill rolls and 
castings; hydroelectric turbines and generators; material handling 
equipment; electrical control equipment; excavators, diesel engines 
and locomotives; and heavy industrial equipment. Its exports amounted 
to US$42 million in 1982. 
The group started its activities before the II World War 
as a lift producer. By the late fourties, Vilares was already
.18. 
exporting this product to Latin American countries and began to 
gain significant shares of some of these markets. At the begining 
of 1983, its contracts for lift and escalator exports amounted to 
us$8.5 million; Bolivia, Chile and Paraguay were the main importers. 
The establishment of subsidiaries abroad was undertaken 
during the seventies - Mexico in 1972, Colombia in 1974, Chile in 
1977, Uruguay in 1978, Paraguay in 1979 and Argentina in 1980 — 
and aimed at giving support to its lift exports to these countries. 
These subsidiaries are mainly sales outlets and provide assembly 
and installation of the exported lifts as well as after-sales 
technical assistance. They are hence mere instruments of Vilares" 
export activities. Nevertheless, in some countries, Vilares is 
compelled to add local parts to the exported lifts which turns its 
subsidiary into a customer of the local industry. Local content is 
particularly high in Argentina where Vilares exports only the lift 
engine. 
Vilares policy has aimed at the establishment of wholly- 
owned subsidiaries, but the firm was forced to undertake joint 
ventures with local capitalin Mexico (49% of the capital owned by 
vilares) and Colombia (85%) as a result of local government 
requirements. 
Vilares officials do not envisage the undertaking of 
productive activities abroad but may be eventually foreced into 
them if import restrictions were to threaten its exports to some of 
these markets. 
Tur key operations: the Dedini case 
Dedini is certainly the main exporter of complete 
manufacturing plants in Brazil, having exported nine distilleries 
and two sugar plants. 
Dedini group includes three main units:   
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- Dedini Metalurgica was established in the 1920 to 
manufacture crushing mills, boilers and other equipments for sugar 
and alcohol plants. Its present activities involve three manufacturing 
areas-mechanics, boilers and turbines-and it suppliers made-to-order 
capital goods to the steel, cement, mining, chemical and petrochemical 
and paper and pulp industries. 
- CODISTIL was created in 1943 to manufacture alcohcl and 
rum distileries. Its present production also includes equipment fcr 
chemical and petrochemical, paper and ceramics industries, as well 
as sugar mills and steel structures. 
- Dedini Siderurgica was established in 1955 in order to 
provide the group with liquid metal for casting. It now produce 
rolled steel for civil construction and casting steel parts for 
sugar, alcohol, cement, mining and naval industries and for 
hydroelectric plants. 
In addition, the Dedini group produces also, in other 
units, automatic equipment for sugar cane loading, plantation and 
transportation (in a joint venture with the Australian Toft Brothers 
Ltd.), turbines (in a joint venture with Coppus Corporation 
Engineering), synthetic resines and equipment for the casting 
industries (in a joint venture with the English Fordath), refractories 
and electrical equipament. Dedini has also set up an engineering 
firm in 1978, through a joint venture with Kawasaki leavy Industries 
Ltd. 
In contrast with many Brazilian capital good producers, 
Dedini undertook an orderly diversification process which exploited 
its previous technological and marketing experience and aimed at a 
greater horizontal and vertical integration. Its technological 
development was mainly based on its own research and learning 
process but has also benefited to a large extent from know-how 
supplied by foreign producers through technical assistance and 
licencing contracts and joint ventures. Dedini has a leading 
position in the sugar and alcohol equipment markets. It halves the 
former with another local producer (Zanini) and accounts for 80-90* 
of the latter. 
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Dedini has been decisively engaged in export activities. 
Siderúrgica Dedini has been the main exporter in the group. We are 
concerned, however, with complete plant exports and these have been 
undertaken by Metalurgica Dedini and, mainly, by Codistil. The former 
has indeed a limited experience in such exports which includes only 
two sugar plants sold to Venezuela and Honduras on a turn key 
basis. In addition, it also includes know-how exports to Andritz 
Machinenfabriek in Austria and Sporacen in France. Codistil, in 
turn, has exported nine alcohol distilleries and is near to export 
six additional plants, 
Codistil was established in 1943 through the take-over of 
a small distillery producer and kept a pratically monopolistic 
position in the distillery market until the mid-seventies. At that 
time, some of Codistil's managers and engineers left the firm and 
established a new company-Conger — to compete in the alcohol 
equipment market. Insofar as the know-how of the new firm was 
restricted to the distillation process, it entered into association 
with Zanini (the sugar equipment producer) which were to supply the 
necessary know-how. This partnership broke down some years later 
but then Zanini had already assimilated Codistil's distillation 
know-how. By the late seventies, Zanini started manufacturing its 
own distilleries. These three producers-Dedini, Conger and Zanini, 
account for pratically all the Brazilian distillery production at 
present; Codistil's share in such market is between 80% and 90%. 
Following the general pattern of Dedini group, the 
technological development of Codistil was mainly based on its own 
research activities but relied also on technical assistance agreement 
with French, German, American and Swedish companies. An example of 
such a mix is provided by the recent introduction of two new 
distillation processes in Codistil's alcohol plants: one (Biostil) 
was licenceã from the Swedish innovator (the plant erected by 
Codistil in 1981 was the second commercial plant to use such a 
process in the world); the other (Flegstil) was developed by the 
Brazilian firm, being introduced in 1983. Codistil considers its 
process and product technology to be equivalent to its foreign 
competitors. Nevertheless, the degree of automation of its alcohol   
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plants is small, as compared with those produced by developed 
country companies. This can be attributed to the scarcity of 
specialized workers in the Brazilian economy and, rather than being 
a handicap, may favour Codistal's sales in developing countries 
where potential customers are likely to face the same scarcity. What 
may adversely affect the firm's competitiveness, however, are the 
contractual links with its licensors. In fact, although not 
necessarily a decisive obstacle to exports, licencing agreements 
are always a nuisance as Codistil has to enter into specific, and 
frequently hard, negotiations with its licensors in order to get 
their authorization for most of its prospective export deals. 
Codistil's alcohol plant exports have been restricted to 
Latin America, as shown in the table below. Most of these exports 
consisted of the supply of the complete plant on a turn key basis. 
The exceptions are the three sales to Venezuela and Peru; in these 
cases, Codistil supplied only the distillation unit on a turn key 
basis and provided technical assistance for the installation of 
other sections of the plant. 
Capacity 
Year Country (10001/day) Type 
1964 Bolivia 15 beverage 
1970 Paraguay 12 beverage 
1975 Venezuela 60 beverage 
1977 Bolivia 30 beverage 
1978 Costa Rica 120 fuel (anhydrous) 
1978 Costa Rica 120 fuel (anhydrous) 
1979 Paraguay 120 fuel (anhydrous) 
1981 Peru 20 beverage 
1982 Peru 10 beverage 
The launching of the Alcohol National Program (Proalcool) 
by the Brazilian Government in 1974 was decisive for Codistil. This 
Programme, which aimed at the substitution of alcohol for petrol in 
automotive vehicles, required a very substantial increase in alcohol 
production and gave rise to massive investments in the alcohol 
industry. The large rise in demand for distilleries not only implied 
a very rapid increase in Codistil production but also induced
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significant technological advance. In fact, of the 510 distilleries 
which Codistil produced until 1983, 365 units (73% of the total) 
were produced after 1973. Annual production, which had declined to 
an average of three units during the period 1968/1973, jumped to 
16 in 1974 and rose continuously to reach 58 units in 1978, During 
the last five years, annual production fluctuated around an average 
of 3B units. In addition, the evolution of productive capacity 
(expressed in thousand liter/day) of Codistil's distilleries also 
reflects the impact of the Alcohol Program on the firm's technological 
capability: 12 in 1946; 20 in 1949; 30 in 1953; 60 in 1955; 90 in 
1967; 120 in 1974; 220 in 1976; 240 in 1981; and 300 in 1983. 
It is noteworthy that the increase in Codistil's export 
effort (and in its effective exports) ocurred simultaneously with 
the rise in domestic demand. In fact, this move towards external 
markets resulted from its growing technical capability and long-run 
policy rather than from the necessity of finding an outlet for its 
production capacity. In any case, the firm has limited expectations 
about the role of exports in its future evolution. Firm officials 
are conscious that domestic demand for distilleries will decline in 
the near future as a result of the completion of the investment 
programme introduced by Proalcool. They do not consider, however, 
that the external market will provide a sufficient outlet for the 
firm's productive capacity. In this respect, Codistil is rather 
prepared to respond to any future decline in domestic demand for 
distilleries through the further diversification of its activities. 
Furthermore, despite being itself a large sugar and 
alcohol producer in Brazil, Codistil does not envisage undertaking 
such productive activities abroad. In fact, firm officials flatly 
deny the possibility of associating its turn key exports with 
undertakings of joint ventures abroad. 
Finally, it must be pointed out that the efforts to export 
alcohol distilleries on a turn key basis are not restricted to 
Dedini. Zanini has set up a wholly-owned subsidiary in Panama (1978) 
to market its technology, as well as establishing a cooperation 
agreement with Foster-Wheeler to manufacture, sell and install 
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alcohol distilleries abroad. Furthermore, Conger has effectively 
sold, on a turn key basis, a pilot plant (with a capacity of 2,500 
liter/day) to Peru in 1976, a small plant (7,500 1/day) to Venezuela 
in 1977 and a 60,000 1/day plant to Kenya in 1979. Also Fives Lille, 
a marginal producer in Brazil, has supplied a complete plant to 
Panama. 
Turn key cum equity participation: The Acepar case 
The supply of a steel plant on a turn key basis to Paraguay 
is certainly the most interesting (though possibly not the most 
relevant) case of industrial technology exports by Brazilian firms. 
The 100,000 tons p.a. charcoal-based plant, which will be the first 
steel plant in Paraguay and is due to produce steel bars, light 
shapes and steel wire, is a joint venture between the Paraguayan 
government and the technology suppliers — Tenenge and Coferraz. 
Coferraz is a semi-integrated steel producer, which was 
established during the sixties with the take-over of a 20,000 tons 
p.a. steel plant. The firm has undergone significant productivity 
improvement and capacity expansion since then and its production 
reached 250,000 tons in 1981. In 1982, Coferraz went bankrupt. 
The key agent in the Paraguayan undertaking, however, is 
Tenenge — a large construction and engineering firm, with a turnover 
of US$290 million in 1982, and the leading position in the Brazilian 
assembling service market. Its previous experience spans the steel, 
chemical and petrochemical, pulp and paper and cement industries, 
electric power plants and electric transmission systems and offshore 
oil prospecting and production platforms. As far as steel is 
concerned, Tenenge has a great deal of experience in the erection 
of steel plants as it has participated in the building or expansion 
of most of Brazil's largest units. Furthermore, Tenenge has enlarged 
its know how by taking over, in 1975, the Brazilian subsidiary of the 
French firm Serete, which accounted for the detail engineering of 
many large steel plants in Brazil. Nevertheless, Tenenge had no 
previous experience in basic engineering for steel plants,
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Tenenge has moved steadily towards the external market 
during the seventies, and become the second largest exporter of 
assembling services (the first place is held by a foreign 
subsidiary - SADE). Its activities abroad have been concentrated in 
Paraguay and Chile, where it has established wholly-owned subsidiaries 
to give support to its assembling activities. Furthermore, Tenenge 
has also set up a subsidiary in Paraguay (Mepar) in order to produce 
and erect steel structures; however, this subsidiary would be closed 
down because of a lack of orders. 
Tenenge started its attempt to sell a steel plant to 
Praguay in 1970. It took Tenenge more than five year to overcome 
the institucional and financial obstacles to such an undertaking. 
The institutional scheme for making the project viable included the 
establishment of a State-owned holding company (Siderpar) which was 
to become the main partner of the new steel producer company. This 
was set upas a joint venture in which Siderpar holds 60% of the capital, 
Coferraz, 38% and Tenenge 2%. 
The Paraguayan Government, however, could not meet the 
costs of the undertaking, which is now estimated at US$200 million. 
The Foreign Trade Division of Banco do Brasil (Cacex) then agreed to 
finance the project, with the requirement of a local counterpart of 
only 10%. As a result, Cacex's financing is expected to reach US$1B6 
million: the remaining US$15 million will be financed from Acepar's 
own funds. Cacex had already paid out US$145 million by the end of 
1983, which corresponds to the second largest financing supplied by 
Cacex to service exports (the largest amounted to US$210 million 
and is related to a US$1.2 billion railroad project in Irag). This 
financing is paid out in cruzeiros and should be spent in the purchase 
of capital goods and in the payment of engineering services in 
Brazil. 
Tenenge was to be responsible for the project and 
construction management, Siderpar for the charcoal supply scheme, 
and Coferraz was to be charged with the plant operation and with the 
sale of part of its production in the Brazilian market (since 
domestic demand in Paraguay corresponds to only half of the plant   
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productive capacity). It is noteworthy, however, that the recent 
bankruptcy of Coferraz may affect some of these arrangements. 
As mentioned above, Tenenge had no previous experience in 
basic engineering for steel plants. In order to overcome such a 
shortcoming, Tenenge contracted in experienced engineers from 
Acesita and Belgo Mineira - a State-owned firm and a foreign subsidiary 
respectively, which operate large charcoal-based steel plants. The 
-first outline of the basic engineering for the Acepar project was 
hence a result of the operational experience of those engineers, 
In addition to the basic engineering, Tenenge has accounted also 
for some of the detail engineering, for the civil construction and 
assembling and for the procurement of equipment. 
It is noteworthy that the technological contribution of 
the equipment producers went further than the mere undertáking of 
detail engineering and the supply of equipment as they have included, 
in some cases, important changes in the basic engineering originally 
outlined by Tenenge, These equipment suppliers are mainly Brazilian 
subsidiaries of multinational capital goods producers, and local 
firms under licencing of those producers. The foreign subsidiaries 
are Demag (which supplied the steel works and the continuous ingot 
line), Pholig Heckel (transport equipment) and L'Air Liquid (oxygen 
plant). The local producers are CONFAB (which supplied the blast 
furnace, in association with Paul Wurth), Prensas Schuller (rolling 
unit, with technology from Schelsman) and GTI (calcination unit). 
Acepar project has involved also at least eight different 
engineering firms which have provided design, assembling and 
specialized engineering services. Among them, the most important 
contributions are those by Cobrapi (a State-owned engineering firm 
with large experience in steel technology) and Clepan (a subsidiary 
of a French firm) which have provided detail engineering for the 
blast furnace supplied by CONFAB and for the oxygen plant supplied 
by L'Air Liquid, respectively. 
The previous information suggests some final comments. To 
start with, it must be pointed out that the Acepar project was made
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possible due to Tenenge's ability to build up the necessary 
institutional and financing framework. It is also noteworthy that, 
when undertaking this project, Tenenge could only partially rely on 
its know-how and previous experience. In fact, although it did not 
involve very complex technology, the project requirements were 
a step beyond Tenenge's technological capability. In this context, 
as the project nears its end, its successful completion can be 
ascribed to Tenenge's ability to undertake project management and 
procurement. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the experience of such 
projects is likely to facilitate new undertakings abroad. Tenenge 
has been near to sell a similar steel plant to Uruguay; the project 
was postponed, however, as a result of the financial difficulties 
faceê by the Uruguayan government. 
Direct investment in a homogenous product industry: the Gerdau case 
Gerdau is the second largest foreign investor among 
Brazilian manufacturing firms. Its investments amount the Us$14,5 
million and result from its taking over two steel producers in 
Uruguay in 1981. 
Gerdau is the largest non-flat steel manufacturer and 
also the largest private steel producer, with total output capacity 
of 2,040 million tons p.a. and accounts for six plants spread from 
the North to the South in Brazil. Its sales-which include construction 
steel, bars and light shapes and wire — account for 33% of the 
domestic demand for these products. Its exports correspond to 35% 
of its production, Its six productive units are semmi-integrated 
plants using electric furnaces and cover a wide range of output 
capacity: two are arcund 50 thousand tons p.a.; three, within the 
240 thousand to 320 thousand tons p.a. range; and the largest one, 
1,035 tons p.a. 
Originally a nail manufacturer, Gerdau entered into the 
steel industry through the take over of a small plant in the South   
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of Brazil during the fourties. This pattern was repeated when it 
came to expand its activities to other regions: its entry into three 
regional markets resulted also from the take over of small plants 
which were then significantly expanded. 
By the late seventies, Gerdau had come to account for more 
than 30% of its domestic market and decided that it was too risky to 
increase its market share on the ground that further growth might 
make it liable to nationalization. The move towards the external 
market arise as an alternative strategy. 
Uruguay was a natural choice. To start with, Uruguay is 
nearer the company headquarters than most of its Brazilian plants. 
Furthermore, Gerdau was familiar with the Uruguayan market as it 
had experience in exporting ingots and final products to this 
country. In particular, Gerdau came to know that one of its customers 
was facing a difficult situation and was willing to sell its 
business. Finally, the entry into Uruguayan industry did not require 
significant investment and could be considered an experiment in 
going abroad. On the other hand, the take over solution was a 
convenient option. For one thing, Gerdau had previcus experience of 
such a growth policy. In addition, the progressive expansion of 
existing productive capacity avoided disturbing the tiny Uruguayan 
market. 
Gerdau's entry into Uruguay involved the take over of two 
firmsmwhich were partially owned by the same shareholders. Allis 
was a steel ingot producer which operated a electric furnace. Laisa 
was a flat rolled producer, with an output capacity of 12,000 tons. 
p.a., which had accounted for 30% of domestic demand but whose market 
share had declined to 15%. Laisa produced bars and light shapes 
and had Allis and Gerdau as its main ingot suppliers. 
Technically both plants were in rather bad shape. By 
merging the two firms, Gerdau's became the first semi-integrated 
steel manufacturer in Uruguay (however, its two competitors would 
soon build their own ingot unit). Furthermore, Gerdau introduced 
significant changes and innovations in the productive process and
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undertook investment aiming at expanding output capacity and 
improving productivity. The ingot unit (Allis) which had been 
producing 800 tons per month in three shifts was soon brought up 
to produce 1,600 tons per month in two shifts. Flat rolled output 
capacity was raised to 39,000 tons p.a.. At the moment, Gerdau is 
setting up a continuous ingot line and expanding the number of 
items produced by its subsidiary. Gerday supplies 40% of the 
Uruguavan demand for flat rolled products; its competitors are an 
Argentinian subsidiary (with 40% of the market) and a local producer 
(208). 
. Insofar as Gerdau sticks to its decision of not increasing 
its share in the domestic market, its growth will depend , in the 
long run, on further expansion abroad or on the diversification of 
its activities. Nevertheless, the firm is unwilling to undertake 
investment abroad at the moment, due to the prevailing conditions in 
the world steel market. In any case, its preference for the next 
investment is the U.S. market where, following its traditional 
pattern, the firm contemplates to enter by taking over a local 
producer. However, if Gerdau's investment in Uruguay is to be seen 
as an experiment on going abroad, it is hard to see how it could 
lead up to the U.S. market. 
Gerdau is not attracted by the undertaking of joint 
ventures abroad, In fact, it has a previous experience in Brazil 
where it built its largest plant in a joint venture with Thyssen, 
The partnership did not work well and broke down some years later. 
This unsuccesful experience seems to account for its lack of 
interest in similar undertakings abroad. 
Joint venture in a gifferentiated oligopoly: the Caloi case 
Calci constitutes a most interesting case on several 
grounds. To start with, it is one of the few examples of local 
firms able to keep a leading position in a differentiated 
oligopolistic market. Furthermore, its drive towards the external 
market has not been restricted to exports but includes also the   
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undertaking of productive activity abroad in joint ventures with 
local capital. The following comments on the experience of Caloi 
sums up the case study presented in Sercovich (1981). 
Caloi was set up to sale, service and repair imported 
bicycles and motorcycles at the end of the last century. It started 
manufacturing parts during II World War and assembling bicycles 
in 1948. Its production expanded significantly during the following 
decades. Its marketing strategy, like its competitors', has 
progressively changed from a small and rather stable product range 
into a production differentiation policy which implies the increase 
in the number of models supplied to the market and periodic product 
design changes. Its successful engagement in this new pattern of 
competition has ensured Caloi a significant share in this 
differentiated market: it produces 40 different models and halves 
90% of the bicycle market with the subsidiary of the Swedish firm 
Monark, 
This evolution was associated with an effort of technology 
absorption undertaken by Caloi from the sixties, which consisted 
mainly in sending teams of technicians to Europe to get acquainted 
with European. technology. This effort did not solely contemplate 
the mere assimilation of European productive methods but also 
entailed the adaptation of such technology to the smaller size of 
the Brazilian bicycle market. This adaptation implied the redesign 
of equipment and new manufacturing specifications and led Caloi to 
undertake vertical integration onthe basis of its own technology. 
The growth of the Brazilian market, however, would cause a rise in 
Caloi's production output and in a few Years it became clear that 
this adapted technology was inadequate. 
The large growth potential of Caloi and the oligopolistic 
structure of the Brazilian bicycle market induced the firm to move 
towards the external market in the early seventies. Its exports, 
originally directed to Latin American countries, were progressively 
extended to other areas and now amount to US$10 million per year. 
This export drive was scon associated with the undertaking 
of productive activities abroad as a result of the setting up of a
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subsidiary in Bolivia in 1973. Seven years later, a second subsidiary 
was established in Colombia. 'Both undertakings are joint ventures 
in which Caloi's share amounts to 49% of capital, the remainder 
being scattered among local individuals. Furthermore, Caloi!s 
Bolivian subsidiary implies also royalty payments for its 
technological contribution (such payments are not allowed by 
Colombian legislation). 
Although the establishment of these subsidiaries aimed 
at circumventing import restrictions, it also provided an alternative 
use for the technology which Caloi had developed for its domestic 
activities and had become inadequate due to the growth of the 
Brazilian market. In fact, the output of its subsidiaries abroad 
is quite small as compared with the parent company's. The demand 
of both the Bolivian and Colombian markets amount BO thousand 
bicycles per year each and jointly correspond to about 10% of the 
Brazilian market. Furthermore, while Caloi has gained the significant 
share of 60% in the former, it still accounts for less than 10% of 
the latter. 
Caloi supplies a complete engineering package to its 
subsidiaries and supervises local part manufacturing. Local contents 
differ only slightly in the two countries — 60% in Bolivia and 
about 75% in Colombia. Nevertheless, the Bolivian subsidiary presents 
a higher degree of backward vertical integration due not only to its 
larger production scale in Bolivia but also to the fact of the more 
developed metal-mechanic sector in Colombia allowing a more 
important role for independent local part producers in this country. 
As suggested by Sercovich (1981), the most relevant 
characteristic of the Caloi experience abrcad is that, in undertaking 
productive activities in smaller and less sophisticated foreign 
markets, Caloi could benefit from its previous experience in its 
domestic market, which it found necessary to supersede as a result 
of the very expansion of this market. In fact, both in Bolivia and 
Colombia, Caloi not only has the chance to reuse the small scale 
production experience which it had developed to supply the Brazilian 
market but also to return to a marketing strategy in which production 
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is concentrated in only a few models (ten in Bolivia and aj In 
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CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES ABROAD IN WHICH MORE THAN 







engineering Number of 
Works Country Contractor £ coitramt 
involved 
Dars and Hydroelectric plants 
Palmar Uruguay Mendes Júnior 9 13 
Colbun Chile Odebrecht 5 
5 
Charcani Peru Odebrecht. 2 
2 
Acaray Paraguay C.B.P.0. 3 4 
Iguazú Paraguay C.B.P.0. 1 1 
El Izdahar Algeria Rabello 3 3 
Guri Venezuela Camargo Corrêa 3 3 
and Cetenco 
Total 26 a 
Highways and railroads 
Railroad Irag Mendes Júnior 6 7 
Highway Mauritania Mendes Júnior 2 2 
Chimorê-yapacani Bolivia Andrade Gutierrez 1 1 
Metro de Caracas Venezuela Cetenco 1 2 
Moroguno-Dodoma Tanzania Ecisa AE 1 
Total ARE 13 
Others . 
Airport -Porto Suarez Bolivia Affonseca E 
Port - La Paloma Uruguay Ecex and Concic 2 3 
Total 40 48 
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TABLE 28 
PROJECTS ABROAD IN WHICH MORE THAN ONE BRAZILIAN 
ENGINEERING FIRMS IS INVOLVED 
 
Other 
- Brazilian Project Country Main rino nber 
E o ai 
involved Contr 
Dams and hydroelectric plants 
Paso Severino Uruguay Hid ic 2 É 
Mini Tanzania — Tecnosolo and - 2 
Geotecnica 
Tablachaca cet lca 1 $ 
Highways 
Quito-Guaiaquil Ecuador Hidroservice 2 3 
Santa Cruz-Corumbã Bolivia 2 ã 
Manufacturing plants 
Aceros del Paraguay Paraguay 8 3 
To 
ni 15 25 
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TABLE 29 
FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES' SHARE IN THE BOOK VALUE (1975) 
AND EXPORTS (1978) OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
 
Percentage 
Book Value Exports 
(1975) (1978) 
Normetallic Minerals 28 30.5 
Metallurgy 32 16.9 
Machinery 36 55.8 
Electrical and Commnication Ecuipment 58 76,7 
Transport Equipment 66 67.9 
Timber 0 12.2 
Furniture e a 
Paper and Pulp 20 22.6 
Rubber 87 80.6 
Leather 0 21.5 
Chemicals 55 18.4 
Pharmaceuticals 8o 65.9 
Perfumary and Soap 60 11.9 
Plastic Material 0 17,3 
Textile Jl 24.6 
Apparel 10 1.8 
Food Processing 18 23.3 
Beverages 10 28.1 
Tobacco 100 - 
Editorial and Printing 0 1.5 
Other 40 26.5 
TOTAL 36 37.2 
 
Source: A.S.Calabi, G.D. Reiss and P.M. Levy, Geração de Poupanças e Estrutura 
de Capital das Empresas do Brasil, São Paulo: Instituto de Pesquisa 
Econômica, 1981 e H.C.Braga, '“Aspectos distributivos do esquema de sub 
sidios fiscais à exportação de manufaturados, Pesquisa e Planejamento 
Ecorêmico, Vol. 11, nº 3, Rio de Janeiro, 1981.   
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